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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The complexity of cyber-physical systems (CPS), the roles and responsibilities of the humans that
interact with them, and the cyber-security of these highly interconnected systems have led to a
new research paradigm known as resilient CPS. By considering the elements and disciplines that
contribute to a more effective design, resilient CPS provide interdisciplinary solutions for problems
such as how to tailor the control system to enable it to respond to disturbances quickly and effi-
ciently, how to better integrate widely distributed CPS to prevent faults that result in disruptions
to operations of critical infrastructure, and how to design cyber-security protection mechanisms so
that the system defends itself from cyber-attacks by changing its behaviors.
A resilient CPS is one that should maintain state awareness and an accepted level of operational
normalcy in response to any disturbances, including threats of unexpected and malicious nature. In
particular, a resilient CPS maintains its operational goals in the presence of:
• System Faults: Advanced control algorithms deployed in CPS are dependent upon data from mul-
tiple sensors to predict the behaviors of the system and make corrective responses. However, such
systems can become brittle to the extent that any unrecognized fault or degradation in the sensors
can lead to incorrect responses by the control algorithm and potentially compromise the desired
operation. Therefore, advanced control algorithms in resilient CPS require the implementation of
detection and diagnosis architectures to recognize sensor faults and degradations.
• Cyber-Attacks: Computer security and sensor network security have focused on prevention mech-
anisms but do not address how a CPS can continue to function under attacks. Control theory,
on the other hand, has strong results on robust and fault-tolerant algorithms against well-defined
uncertainties or faults, but there is little work accounting for attacks caused by malicious adver-
saries.
1
1.2 Challenges
A resilient CPS must be able to detect failures and cyber-attacks quickly and accurately in order to
minimize their adverse effects. While a large number of anomaly detection methods are designed in
other domains, they are often built with Information Technology (IT) systems in mind. Thus, typical
anomaly detectors do not take into account the properties of the physical components of CPS and
are merely based on the cyber components. Also, anomaly detectors designed specifically for CPS
are often faced with limitations such as inapplicability to general CPS domains and shortcomings
such as high overhead that make them undesirable solutions. Hence, a significant challenge is the
design of anomaly detectors that effectively detect failures and cyber-attacks in CPS.
To design anomaly detectors and analyze their performance, a model of the physical system is
needed. The model can be used, for example, to predict the future state of the CPS or to define
utility and loss functions. Models of the physical system are typically developed using either physical
laws or data-driven system identification methods. While models based on physical laws provide
high fidelity, they are often very hard to obtain due to the highly nonlinear and complex nature of
the system. In addition, although data-driven models are relatively simple to obtain, they often do
not provide the precision and accuracy of models based on the physical laws. Therefore, another
challenge is the design of accurate and precise models of the physical system.
In design and evaluation of anomaly detectors, realistic attack models that represent the harmful
effects of cyber-attacks on CPS are needed. However, unlike fault detection where assumptions are
made about the properties of faults, making restrictive assumptions about strategic cyber-attacks is
not permitted since it results in unrealistic models. Thus, there is a challenge in obtaining attack
models that adequately represent the attack while not being too restrictive.
In anomaly detectors, while it is desirable to simultaneously improve detection performance and
security overhead, this is often impossible due to the trade-offs between them. These trade-offs
can typically be changed through selecting different configurations for anomaly detectors, where
each configuration results in a different detection performance and security overhead. Finding the
right configuration that optimally balances the trade-off between detection performance and security
overhead is another challenge.
The final challenge is the design of resilient control algorithms that guarantee some notion of
correct behavior at a minimum level of performance even when the system is under attack. For
example, in traffic signal control, it is desirable that when traffic flow sensors are under attack, traffic
signal controllers still maintain a minimum level of performance to avoid disastrous congestions.
2
1.3 Contributions
In this section, we present an overview of the contributions towards addressing the outlined chal-
lenges. In particular, the focus of our contributions is on improving resilience of CPS through design
and evaluation of anomaly detection methods that incorporate domain-specific properties of the
physical system. The contributions of this document are described below.
Chapter 3
We study the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly-based detection in dynamical sys-
tems in the face of strategic attacks. Specifically, we have the following contributions:
• We formulate a two-player Stackelberg game between a defender and an adversary. The adversary
attacks the system, choosing the time and type of the attack (e.g., type of harmful chemical
introduced into a water-distribution network) to maximize the inflicted damage. On the other
hand, the defender selects detection thresholds to minimize both damage from best-response
attacks and the cost of false alarms.
• We present a dynamic-programming based algorithm to solve the game and compute optimal
time-dependent thresholds. We analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm and show that
its running time scales polynomially as the length of the time horizon of interest increases.
• We provide and study a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of computing optimal fixed
thresholds, which do not change with time.
• We study the problem of finding optimal thresholds in the presence of random faults and attacks,
and present an algorithm that computes the optimal thresholds.
• We evaluate our results by applying it to the detection of contamination attacks in a water-
distribution system. Since expected damage to the system by an attack is time-dependent as
water demand changes throughout the day, the time-dependent threshold strategy can achieve
much lower losses than a fixed-threshold strategy. Our simulation results confirm this, showing
that time-dependent thresholds significantly outperform fixed ones.
Chapter 4
We study the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly detection of faulty traffic sensors,
considering route planning as the application of interest. The objective is to select the optimal
3
thresholds of anomaly detectors in order to optimize the performance of the route planning appli-
cation in the presence of faulty sensors. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• We devise an effective anomaly detector for identifying faulty traffic sensors using a prediction
model based on Gaussian Processes.
• We present an approach for computing the optimal parameters of the detector which minimize
losses due to false-positive and false-negative errors.
• We characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the traffic application.
• We implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a real-world dataset and the route
planning platform OpenTripPlanner [93].
Chapter 5
We propose a framework for application-aware anomaly detection in sensors measurements in CPS.
The objective is to optimally configure all anomaly detectors of a CPS such that the performance loss
in the presence of detection errors is minimized. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We present an approach to recover from anomalies in order to maintain operation when detection
alerts are triggered.
• We propose the application-aware anomaly detector, in which the anomaly detector is optimally
configured such that the performance loss in the presence of detection errors is minimized. In
particular, the thresholds are selected such that the performance of the system in the presence of
detection errors is as close as possible to the performance that could have been obtained if there
were no detection errors.
• We prove that the application-aware detection problem is, in general, NP-hard. We then present
an algorithm to efficiently find near-optimal solutions.
• We study two special variations of the application-aware detection problem, that is, single detector
and detectors with equal threshold. We optimally solve both special cases, which can be used in
resource-constrained environments.
• We perform experiments on a case study of real-time control of traffic signals. We evaluate our
approach numerically and show its benefits compared to standard anomaly detection practices.
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Chapter 6
We study the adversarial regression problem, in which an omniscient adversary that is capable
of perturbing the values of a subset of sensors attempts to drive a CPS to an unsafe state (e.g.,
raising the pressure of a reactor beyond its safety limit in a process control system) while remaining
undetected. We make the following contributions:
• We formulate the adversarial regression problem. In the problem, a safety-critical CPS that is
monitored by regression-based anomaly detectors is considered. Then, an omniscient adversary
that is capable of perturbing the values of a subset of sensors attempts to drive the system to
an unsafe state (e.g., raising the pressure of a reactor beyond its safety limit in a process control
system) without being detected.
• We solve the adversarial regression problem considering different types of regression-based detec-
tors. In particular, we solve the problem for detectors that use linear regression, neural network
regression, and an ensemble of the two as their regression algorithms.
• We present a resilient detector that mitigates the impact of stealthy attacks without increasing
the number of false alarms. The resilient detector achieves this by resilient selection of detection
thresholds.
• We numerically evaluate the adversarial regression problem, and demonstrate the effectiveness of
the resilient detector through applying our methods to a case study of a process control system.
1.4 Organization
The technical contributions of this thesis are in Chapters 3-6. The organization is as follows.
• Chapter 2 reviews the related work in the research of resilient CPS.
• Chapter 3 presents the problem of selecting optimal thresholds for attack detection in dynamical
environments.
• Chapter 4 presents the problem of optimal detection of faulty traffic sensors used in route planning.
• Chapter 5 proposes the application-aware anomaly detection framework.
• Chapter 6 studies the problem of adversarial regression in CPS.
• Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
5
Chapter 2
Related Work
The breadth of material in the resilient CPS literature is exorbitant since it spans several areas
including control theory, information security, game theory, and artificial intelligence. To be ger-
mane, this chapter only reviews works that are most related to the contributions of this document.
We begin with an overview of resilience in CPS in Section 2.1. Then, in Section 2.2, we discuss
attack detection in CPS, where we also provide relevant background on anomaly detection. In Sec-
tion 2.3, we review existing work on game-theoretical approaches for anomaly detection in CPS. We
discuss different research directions on anomaly detection within the scope of machine learning in
Section 2.4. Finally, in Section 2.5, we discuss how the contributions of this dissertation fit within
the scope of the literature.
2.1 Resilience in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
Resilience in engineering is defined as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior
to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under
both expected and unexpected conditions” [59]. Similarly, resilience in CPS is defined as protecting
the operational goals (e.g., stability) as well as other non-operational goals (e.g., privacy) in the
presence of both expected events (e.g., failures) and unexpected events (e.g., cyber-attacks) [26].
Resilience in CPS must attain three goals: (1) Integrity which represents the trustworthiness
of data or resources, (2) Availability which is the ability to access and use information on demand
as specified, and (3) Confidentiality, which is the ability to keep information secret or private from
unauthorized users. To satisfy these goals, merely applying well-known IT-resilience measures to
CPS is not enough. This is because unlike IT systems, where resilience essentially involves encryption
and protection of data, resilience in CPS considers unwanted behavior that can potentially influence
the physical system’s behavior. Therefore, there exist fundamental vulnerabilities, threats and
challenges, which are a result of CPS’s complex and typically distributed architectures and the
interconnection of IT and control systems, that need to be addressed [26], [27].
Malicious attacks against CPS can be categorized into deception attacks (or integrity attacks)
and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Deception attacks refer to the possibility of compromising the
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integrity of control packets or measurements, and they are cast by altering the behavior of sensors
and actuators. DoS attacks, instead, compromise the availability of resources by, for instance,
jamming the communication channel. Deception attacks result in the lack of the security goal of
integrity, and DoS attacks result in the lack of the security goal of availability.
Analysis of CPS-resilience against malicious attacks and design of algorithms and architectures
to survive such attacks has received increasing attention [26], [27]. Elements from information
security, sensor network security, and control theory that can be used for solving the problem of
CPS-resilience are discussed in [26]. While existing approaches provide many useful mechanisms
for improving security of CPS, they are not sufficient when used against CPS. A detailed three-
dimensional attack space is proposed that links different types of attacks to the attacker’s resources
and knowledge of the system is presented in [128]. This attack space gives insight to both the
attacker and the defender on how an attack can be perpetuated, as well as the potential impact
of the attack on CPS. To demonstrate different attack scenarios captured by the attack space, a
testbed of a quadruple tank process under cyber-attacks is analyzed.
DoS attacks are studied for discrete-time linear dynamical systems in [6]. The attack model is
defined by generalizing traditional uncertainty classes and safety constraints are defined as security
requirements of the control system. From the defender’s perspective, the objective is to design
control laws that are robust against the attacker’s actions, whereas from the attacker’s viewpoint,
the goal is to determine the optimal attack plan that degrades the performance of the system as
much as possible. Following this scenario, an optimal attack plan for discrete-time linear dynamical
systems is proposed. DoS attacks are also studied in the context of an adversary that jams the
communication between the CPS’s plant and controller for a limited time [53]. A saddle-point
equilibrium is proven to exist between the attacker and controller. Then, for a specific instance of
the problem, an optimal policy for jamming attacks is proposed.
Considering deception attacks, the secure estimation and control of linear deterministic systems
under sensor attacks is studied in [44]. The problem is formulated as a dynamic error correction
problem with sparse vectors, and it is shown that by using state feedback, the system’s resilience can
be increased. Furthermore, replay attacks on state estimation in wireless networks are considered
in [98]. Replay attacks are cast by hijacking the sensors, recording the readings for a certain amount
of time, and repeating such readings while injecting an exogenous signal into the system. Such
attacks can be detected by injecting a signal unknown to the attacker into the system [98], [99].
Methods to design cyber-attacks that bypass bad data detectors have been proposed. False data
injection attacks against state estimators are studied in [85]. It is shown that by using the configura-
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Figure 2.1: Summary of related work on CPS security.
tion of the system, an attacker can launch successful attacks that introduce errors into certain state
variables while bypassing existing bad data detectors. Moreover, scenarios demonstrating stealthy
deception attack policies are characterized in [123]. It is assumed that the attacker has complete
model knowledge and full access to all sensor and actuator channels and is able to perform deception
attacks. The stealthy attack policies are illustrated using a water irrigation example.
In addition, stealthy attack policies for networked CPS are characterized in [108]. In particular,
it is shown that an attack is stealthy if the measurements due to the attack coincide with the
measurements due to some nominal operating condition. Experimental stealthy deception attacks on
water irrigation canals controlled by SCADA systems are presented in [7]. A set of stealthy deception
attacks for attackers compromising a subset of sensors and actuators is described in [107]. Stealthy
attacks with limited resources are considered and improved detection methods are proposed in [67],
[68]. A security metric for studying sets of vulnerable sensors is proposed in [119]. The consequences
of stealthy attacks are analyzed in [140], [129]. In particular, the work in [127] analyzes attack policies
with limited model knowledge and performs experiments showing that such attacks are stealthy and
can induce the erroneous belief that the system is in an unsafe state.
All the research described above highlights the significance of security and resilience in CPS.
Figure 2.1 provides a summary of the previous work discussed in this section.
2.2 Attack Detection in CPS
2.2.1 A Brief Introduction to Anomaly Detection
To detect attacks against CPS, anomaly-based detection methods can be employed. What distin-
guishes anomaly-based detectors used in CPS from intrusion detection systems (IDS) used in IT
systems is that the latter is based on creating models of network traffic or software behavior whereas
the former is based on a representative model of the physical system. There also exist other differ-
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Table 2.1: Differences in Attack Detection Between IT Systems and CPS [97]
IT CPS
Monitoring host- or network-level user/ma-
chine activity (e.g., an HTTP request or a web
server).
Monitoring the physical processes (and hence
laws of physics) which govern behavior of
physical devices.
Monitoring user-triggered activities, leading
to high false positive rates due to the unpre-
dictability of user behaviors
Monitoring activities which are frequently au-
tomated, providing some regularity and pre-
dictability for behavior monitoring.
Dealing with mostly non-zero-day attacks,
making knowledge-based detection effective.
Dealing with zero-day or highly sophisticated
attacks, hence making knowledge-based detec-
tion ineffective.
Rarely dealing with legacy components, mak-
ing modeling of the physical processes govern-
ing legacy components unnecessary.
Often dealing with legacy technology, mak-
ing physical model-based detection an effec-
tive technique by specifying the physical pro-
cesses governing behavior of legacy compo-
nents.
ences in attack detection between IT systems and CPS that are summarized in Table 2.1 [97]. From
this point forward, when we refer to anomaly detectors, we mean anomaly detection in the context
of CPS unless otherwise stated.
An anomaly-based detector receives as inputs the sensor measurements from the physical sys-
tem and the control commands sent to the physical system, and then uses them to identify any
suspicious sensor or control commands. Figure 2.2 illustrates a general diagram of such security
monitoring architecture. This architecture contains: (1) the physical phenomena of interest (i.e.,
plant), (2) sensors to observe the physical system and send a time series yk denoting the value of
the measurement at time k, (3) the controller that sends control commands uk to actuators based
on the sensor measurements received, (4) actuators that change the control command to an actual
physical change, and (5) a detection module that contains two subcomponents (i.e., predictor and
statistical test) as described below.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the detection module comprises two main parts: (1) A predictor which
given sensor measurements yk and control commands uk, predicts the future expected measurements
yˆk+1, and (2) An anomaly detector (or statistical test) which given a time series of residuals rk (i.e.,
the difference between the received sensor measurement yk and the predicted measurement yˆk)
determines whether to raise an alarm, denoted by H1, or not, denoted by H0. Note that in this
scheme, it is assumed that the detection module is trusted and its output cannot be attacked. But,
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the inputs provided to the detection module may be attacked. In particular, in a sensor attack, the
attacker deceives the controller about the real state of the plant, and so zk 6= yk. Further, in an
actuator attack, the control command sent to the plant is modified, i.e., uk 6= vk.
Based on the observed sensor or control signals up to time k, we can use data-driven or model-
based methods of the system to predict the expected observations yˆk+1. The difference between the
predictions yˆk+1 computed by the predictor and the measurements yk+1 received from the sensors
is called a residual rk. If the sensor measurements yk are significantly different from the predictions
(i.e., if the residual is large), a detection alarm can be generated. In a stateless test, an alarm is raised
for every single significant deviation at time k, i.e., an alarm is raised if |yk − yˆk| = rk ≥ η where
η is a threshold. In a stateful test, an additional statistic Sk is computed that keeps track of the
historical changes of rk. Then, a detection alarm is generated if the statistic exceeds a threshold,
i.e., Sk ≥ η, which can be due to either a single large deviation or a persistent deviation across
multiple timesteps.
There are many tests that can keep track of the historical behavior of the residual rk such as
taking an average over a time-window, an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA), or using
change detection statistics such as the non-parametric CUmulative SUM (CUSUM) statistic [11].
The CUSUM detector assumes a known probability model for observations, which is not suitable
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Table 2.2: Detection Methods
Features Statistical Test
Cur. In. & Prev. Out. uk, yk−1 Stateless |rk|
H1
≷
H0
η
Prev. Sensor Observ. yk−1, . . . , yk−N Stateful (Sk + |rk| − b)+
H1
≷
H0
η
Table 2.3: Errors in Anomaly Detection
H0 is true H1 is true
Accept H0 Correct decision False negative (missed detection)
Accept H1 False positive (false alarm) Correct decision
for attacks that are unknown by definition, and so non-parametric CUSUM (i.e., CUSUM without
probability likelihood models) is typically used in the CPS security literature. The non-parametric
CUSUM statistic is defined recursively as S0 = 0 and Sk+1 = (Sk+ |rk|−b)+, where (x)+ represents
max(0, x) and b is selected so that the expected value of |rk| − b is less than zero under hypothesis
H0 (i.e., b prevents Sk from increasing consistently under normal operation). An alert is generated
whenever the statistic is greater than a previously defined threshold Sk > η and the test is restarted
with Sk+1 = 0. Table 2.2 provides a summary of different detection methods.
As illustrated in Table 2.3, in anomaly detectors, there might be a false negative, which means
failing to raise an alarm when an anomaly did happen. Further, there might be a false positive, which
means raising an alarm when the system exhibits normal behavior. It is desirable to reduce the FP
and FN probabilities as much as possible. But, there exists a trade-off between them, which can
be controlled by changing the threshold η. In particular, by decreasing (increasing) the threshold
η, one can decrease (increase) the false-negative FN(η) and increase (decrease) the false-positive
probability FP (η). It is possible to plot the false-positive probability FP (η) as a function of the
false-negative probability FN(η) for various threshold values [43].
2.2.2 Model-Based Attack Detection
In this section, we review the literature on model-based attack detection in CPS. Table 2.4 provides
a summary.
Attack detection in industrial process control systems is studied in [28]. An anomaly-based
detector is designed using a predictor, which is based on an LTI model of the physical system, and
a non-parametric CUSUM test. As the attack model, an adversary that launches sensor attacks is
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Table 2.4: Summary of related work on attack detection in CPS.
Detection Attack Monitoring
Paper Stateful Stateless Sensor Actuator Active Static/Dyn.
[108] - X X X - X
[98] - X X X X -
[27] X - X - - X
[42] - X X - - X
[9], [8] - X X - - X
[133] X - X - X -
[128], [130] - X X X - X
[57] X - - X - X
[64] - X X - - X
considered. The adversary has the goal of raising the pressure of a tank beyond safety levels while
remaining undetected. The paper characterizes attacks that cannot be detected by the detector and
then evaluates their effects by running experiments. It is concluded that the considered case study
is resiliently-designed since none of the simulated stealthy attacks result in a safety violation.
Considering a linear descriptor system, fundamental monitoring limitations for CPS are charac-
terized in [108]. An attack is proven to be undetectable by static, dynamic, and active monitors if
and only if it excites only the zero dynamics of the system. Such undetectable attacks, which are also
known as zero-dynamic attacks, can be performed by only compromising the actuators. While study
of zero-dynamic attacks is useful for resilience analysis, most systems are not vulnerable to them
(for example, if states are directly measured or if there is no need for state estimation). Even for the
vulnerable systems, the attacker has restrictions on achieving its objective since specific scenarios
must be followed in launching an attack. To secure the CPS against zero-dynamic attacks, methods
which modify the structure of the system are proposed [130], [128].
In active monitoring, unpredictable control commands are sent to the CPS, and then, it is
verified whether the sensors respond as expected. If the attacker does not adapt its attack to
the unpredictable control command, it may be detected. Active monitoring is applied to state
estimation by embedding a watermark in the control signal [98], [99], [100]. It is also used in power
systems [101], [33], and other domains, [122], [133]. While active monitoring is a useful detection
strategy for systems that are in their steady state, it is not suitable to the systems with highly
variable control signal (e.g., in frequency generators in power systems). Even for systems in steady
state, if an attacker has perfect knowledge, it can design attack vectors that bypass the detector.
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In addition, active monitoring results in performance losses caused by deviating from the optimal
control signal. While there have been attempts to minimize this performance loss [100], this may
still be an undesirable behavior.
Combined cyber and physical attacks are investigated in [9], [8]. In the attack model, the
adversary launches physical attacks on a water distribution system in order to steal water, and then
performs sensor attacks to hide the effects of the physical attack. To detect such attacks, the paper
proposes using unknown input observers. Nevertheless, it is stated that if the adversary has enough
resources to attack enough pipes and sensors, it can always remain stealthy. Such covert attacks are
also characterized for linear and nonlinear systems [123], [124].
The effects of adding security measures to a control system is experimentally characterized in [54].
It is shown that adding security measures can create additional time delay that can degrade the
system’s performances. To compensate for the adverse effect of added security, methods that change
the control parameters in real-time are proposed. Further, a framework to optimize the performance
and security trade-offs in CPS is proposed in [142]. The framework is based on an extension of
evolutionary algorithms known as coevolutionary genetic algorithms, and is able to find the Nash
equilibrium for the trade-off model.
An attack detection mechanism based on the energy balance of a system is proposed in [42].
The approach uses passivity which is a property indicating that the system dissipates more energy
than it generates. To detect attacks, the supplied energy is estimated, and then it is compared to
the sum of the dissipated and stored energy in the CPS. While this approach is novel, its benefits
over observer-based methods is not clear. In addition, if the attack is passive, it always remains
undetected. Also, functions for energy dissipation, which are required for the detector to work, may
be hard or even impossible to obtain for some cases.
Unsupervised clustering has been used to detect attacks in process control systems [64], [70].
The clusters represent the relationship between variables of a process and attacks are identified as
anomalies that do not fit the clusters. The approach has the advantage of creating models of the
physical systems without a priori knowledge. However, its performance may be weak since it does
not consider the time-evolution of the system or the evolution outside of a steady state.
Model-based attack detection has also been studied in other domains such as power systems [21],
[48], [63], [114], [137], and medical systems [57], [58]. In power systems, it is shown that an attacker
can inject false sensor signal for state estimation that will not raise an alarm [85]. There has been
some follow up research on this problem [138], [32], [125], [79]. Further, in medical systems, overdoes
attacks on insulin pumps are studied in [57]. Supervised learning methods are employed to learn
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normal patient infusion patterns, and then, detection is performed using an average of the residuals.
2.3 Game Theory for Detection
In this section, we review game-theoretical approach for the problem of attack detection in CPS.
Game-theoretic principles are formally applied to intrusion detection to develop a decision and
control framework in [3], [4]. Distributed intrusion detection is studied as a game between an
IDS and an attacker using a model that represents the imperfect flow of information from the
attacker to the IDS through a network. Then, the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and best-
response strategies is investigated, and long-term interactions are analyzed using repeated games
and a dynamic model. Further, the detection framework is extended using a stochastic and dynamic
game in which the sensors observing and reporting the attacks to the IDS are modeled as a finite-state
Markov chain [5]. Then, the game is investigated under different assumptions on the information
available to players.
The problem of detecting and classifying an attacker based on its attack type is studied in [38].
In the model, the defender strategically selects its classification policy by choosing a threshold that
balances the cost of missed detections and false alarms, while the attacker tries to maximize its payoff
based on its type. A characterization of the Nash equilibria is then presented in mixed strategies
that can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, randomized detection thresholds using a
general model of adversarial classification is studied in [82]. The goal of using randomized thresholds
is to prevent an attacker from launching stealthy attacks that stay just below the threshold. Both
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed based on the true-positive to false-positive curve of
the detector. Then, it is shown that the randomized thresholds may force an attacker to design less
harmful attacks, which lowers the expected cost of the defender.
Using a zero-sum non-stationary stochastic game, the problem of finding the optimal policy
that switches between control-cost optimal and secure controllers in the presence of replay attacks
is proposed in [95]. It is proven that the optimal strategy exists, and a suboptimal algorithm is
proposed. Further, an approach for finding optimal detection thresholds for multiple IDS employed
in CPS is proposed in [74]. In the model, the attacker mounts an attack against a subset of systems
and the defender detects and mitigates the attack if the IDS of at least one targeted system raises an
alarm. It is shown that finding optimal attacks and defenses is computationally expensive, and then
polynomial-time heuristic algorithms are proposed for computing approximately optimal strategies.
The problem of strategic threshold-selection by a collection of independent self-interested users is
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Figure 2.4: Summary of related work on game-theoretical approaches for anomaly detection in CPS.
considered in [75]. The Stackelberg multi-defender equilibria corresponding to short-term strategic
dynamics is characterized, and a polynomial-time algorithm for computing short-term equilibria is
presented. The Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game between all users and the attacker is also
characterized which models long-term dynamics. It is concluded that if an equilibrium exists, in
both cases, it is unique and socially optimal. Moreover, the problem of optimal signature-based IDS
configuration under resource constraints is studied in [145]. The work uses a cooperative game to
study intrusion detection according to some known attack graphs.
Signaling games are also used to study intrusion detection [40]. For instance, an intrusion
detection game based on the signaling game is proposed in order to select the optimal detection
strategy that lowers resource consumption in [121]. Intrusion detection in heterogeneous networks,
in which detectors monitor the nodes that can be targeted by attackers, is investigated in [30]. The
attackers’ actions are defined as the probabilities of attacking each of the targets, and the defender’s
actions are defined as the probabilities of defending against attacks by considering the false alarm
rate and the detection rate of the IDS. The best defense strategies are computed for the cases of
one or multiple IDS monitoring each attack target. The defender’s strategy is determined by the
amount of resources that the IDS allocate to each of the targets.
Figure 2.4 provides a taxonomy of the related work discussed in this section. The papers are
categorized based on the type of game (i.e., dynamic or static) and the information available to
players.
2.4 Machine Learning for Detection
Machine learning has been widely used to study anomaly detection [29], [131]. But, there is little
work that applies machine learning classification methods to attack detection in CPS. This may be
partially due to the lack of publicly available intrusion data for CPS. Nonetheless, if this limitation
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Figure 2.5: Anomaly detection methods using machine learning [29].
can be overcome through using testbeds or simulation environments, machine learning techniques
can be highly beneficial for resilient detection in CPS. For instance, machine learning methods
can be used to construct data-driven estimators to predict the future states, build supervised-
or unsupervised-learning anomaly detectors (as shown in Figure 2.5), and develop secure learning
methods for resilient detection.
2.4.1 Attack Detection
A behavior-based machine learning approach for attack detection in CPS is proposed in [61]. The
work models the physical process of CPS to detect any anomaly or attack that may try to change the
system’s behavior. Using a replicate of a real water treatment facility, different data-driven anomaly
detectors are implemented and their performances are evaluated. While this work successfully
applies machine learning algorithms for attack detection in CPS, the studied attack scenarios are
very restrictive. Thus, it is unclear whether the high detection rates reported in the paper are
due to the effectiveness of the approach or due to the restrictive attack models. Using the same
testbed, the impact of single-point cyber-attacks are experimentally investigated in [1]. Cyber-
attacks are launched through a SCADA server connected to programmable logic controllers that
govern the actuators and sensors. Several experiments are performed considering different objectives
for the attacker. Then, based on the observed experiment results, attack detection mechanisms are
proposed.
Data-driven anomaly detection is studied using a miniature industrial gas system with a few
sensors and actuators in [102]. To detect attacks, one physical process attribute (i.e., pressure in
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pipeline) and two one-class classifiers (i.e., support vector data description and kernel principal
component analysis) are used. Then, different attack scenarios are considered to evaluate the de-
tection performance. According to the results presented in the paper, while single-point attacks
have a detection rate of 99.25 percent, more complicated attacks have much lower detection rates
of approximately 65-70 percent. This shows that the detector’s performance significantly decreases
when faced by complex attacks. Further, an intrusion detection method based on neural networks
is investigated using a water testbed that contains a tank, pump, and level sensor [45]. Network
traffic, SCADA mode, water level, and pump status are used as the attributes, and then the method
is evaluated considering malicious attacks on the level sensor. Finally, using the same testbed, a
one-class approach is studied in [103].
An intrusion detection system that uses neural network-based modeling is proposed in [81].
Network data recorded from an existing critical infrastructure is used as normal behavior, and
randomly generated data is used to model intrusions. To learn the model, a combination of two
neural network learning algorithms, namely Error back propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt, is
employed. Then, the method is evaluated using network data, and it is claimed that the detection
approach achieves a perfect detection rate while generating no false positives on test data.
An unsupervised data-driven framework for system-wide anomaly detection is presented in [83].
The framework involves a spatiotemporal feature extraction scheme for discovering and representing
causal interactions among the subsystems of a CPS, and a free energy estimation of system-wide
patterns using a Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM). It is stated that the proposed framework can
capture multiple nominal modes with one graphical model and can be effectively used for anomaly
detection. Moreover, a formal methods approach to the problem of intrusion detection for CPS
security is discussed in [60]. The proposed algorithmic method is capable of inferring a data classifier
in the form of a signal temporal logic formula from unlabeled data. The inferred formula can be
interpreted in natural language and can be used for online monitoring.
A Bayesian network approach for learning the causal relations between cyber and physical vari-
ables as well as their temporal correlations from unlabeled data is presented in [69]. Data transfor-
mations are performed to deal with the heterogeneous characteristics of the cyber and physical data
so that the integrated dataset can be used to learn the Bayesian network structure and parameters.
Scalable algorithms are then presented to detect different anomalies and isolate their respective root-
cause using a Bayesian network. The algorithm is evaluated using an unlabeled dataset consisting
of anomalies due to faults and cyber-attacks in a commercial building system.
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2.4.2 Adversarial Learning
Adversarial learning studies secure adoption of machine learning techniques in adversarial settings.
Adversaries can be categorized based on the influence on classifier, security violation, and speci-
ficity [20]. The influence is either causative which undermines the learning algorithm to cause mis-
classifications via influencing training data and potentially test data, or exploratory which causes
misclassifications via affecting test data. The security violation can be an integrity violation which
allows the adversary to access protected resource and cause misclassification of illegitimate samples,
an availability violation which denies service to users and can cause misclassification of legitimate
and illegitimate samples, or privacy violation which allows the adversary to obtain confidential
information. The specificity of an attack can be either targeted or indiscriminate.
Adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) learning problem is introduced in [86]. In
ACRE, an adversary launches an attack to minimize a cost function, while having limited information
about the classifier. The adversary is allowed to make polynomial number of membership queries
to modify an attack instance to bypass the classifier with minimal cost. In the paper, a query
algorithm for reverse engineering of linear classifiers is presented. Furthermore, in [31], a framework
for the adversarial learning problem is presented that uses game theory. The paper formulates a
game between a classifier and an adversary, and then assuming that the adversary’s optimal strategy
is known, develops the optimal classifier. Then, experiments are performed which show that the
proposed robust classifier outperforms a standard one.
Classifiers that are optimal with respect to a worst-case scenario of feature deletion at test
time are investigated in [51]. A minmax game is formulated to formalize the interaction between
a classifier and a feature removal mechanism, and it is assumed that the players know the strategy
space of each other. The same problem is studied using a zero-sum sequential Stackelberg game
where the adversary acts as the leader and the classifier acts as the follower [84].
Optimal support vector machine (SVM) learning strategies are developed considering two attack
models, namely free-range and restrained [144]. The strategies minimize the hinge loss given that
the adversary maximizes the hinge loss by corrupting the data. Experiments are performed using
different datasets, which report improvements in resilience over standard SVM. The approach is
extended by considering the hierarchical mixtures of experts in the framework [143].
Feature reduction in adversarial settings is studied in [77]. In particular, the paper considers
a model of an adversary that performs feature cross-substitution attacks. To make learning more
robust to such attacks, a heuristic method is presented. In addition, as a general solution, a mixed-
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integer program with constraint generation is presented. The program implicitly trades off overfitting
and feature selection in an adversarial setting using a sparse regularizer along with an evasion
model. Furthermore, a general-purpose scalable retraining framework that can boost robustness of
an arbitrary learning algorithm in the face of adversarial models is proposed in [78].
The literature on adversarial learning is extensive. Previous work also studies evasion attacks [15],
[17], [19], [72]; poisoning attacks [18], [16], [118]; adversarial examples against machine learning [52],
[71], [120]; and secure learning [23], [22].
2.5 Comparison to this Dissertation
The work presented in this thesis addresses specific problems in view of the challenges highlighted
in Section 1.2. In particular, we seek to develop methods for the design, analysis, and evaluation of
resilient anomaly detectors used in CPS. As stated above, what distinguishes our work from previous
work is incorporating domain-specific properties of the underlying physical system in the detector
design. In particular, in Chapter 3, we define a notion of damage caused by attacks that depends on
the state of the physical system. This is then used to optimally configure anomaly detectors such
that they become highly sensitive in critical states. In Chapter 4 and 5, we model the adverse effects
of incorrect detection decisions on the physical system. We then optimally re-design the detector
so that such adverse effects are minimized. In Chapter 6, we study the problem of adversarial
regression in CPS. Aside from the novelty in the problem formulation, what makes this chapter
unique is that it provides practical evidence to support the benefits of resilient anomaly detectors.
Overall, exploiting the tight interaction between the anomaly detector and the physical system for
the benefit of improved resilience, is what distinguishes this work form previous works.
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Chapter 3
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Selecting Optimal Thresholds for Attack Detection in Dynamical
Environments
Adversaries may cause significant damage to smart infrastructure using malicious attacks. To detect
and mitigate these attacks before they can cause physical damage, operators can deploy anomaly
detection systems (ADS), which can alarm operators to suspicious activities. However, detection
thresholds of ADS need to be configured properly, as an oversensitive detector raises a prohibitively
large number of false alarms, while an undersensitive detector may miss actual attacksw. This is an
especially challenging problem in dynamical environments, where the impact of attacks may signif-
icantly vary over time. Using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate the problem of computing
optimal detection thresholds which minimize both the number of false alarms and the probability of
missing actual attacks as a two-player Stackelberg security game. We provide an efficient dynamic
programming-based algorithm for solving the game, thereby finding optimal detection thresholds.
We analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm and show that its running time scales poly-
nomially as the length of the time horizon of interest increases. In addition, we study the problem of
finding optimal thresholds in the presence of both random faults and attacks. Finally, we evaluate
our result using a case study of contamination attacks in water networks, and show that our optimal
thresholds significantly outperform fixed thresholds that do not consider that the environment is
dynamical.
3.1 Introduction
Smart infrastructures equipped with data-gathering devices and computational capabilities for data-
intensive analysis lead to efficient monitoring and management of cyber-physical systems including
transportation, electrical, and water distribution systems. The ability to collect diverse data at
low-cost allows for intelligent system monitoring, automation, and efficient resource management.
Continuous monitoring of modern infrastructure networks to detect anomalies and malicious intrud-
ers is a prominent requirement for smart operations. Inability to early detect a malicious attack
on some system component might not only cause disruption of services but could lead to complete
system failure, excessive physical and financial losses. For instance, in water networks, water pipes
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are exposed to the risk of intentional contamination with toxic chemicals. If not detected early,
such malicious attack could have detrimental consequences including poisoning and propagation of
infectious diseases.
Efficient intrusion and attack detection mechanisms need to be employed to quickly and accurately
detect attacks. Attackers, on the other hand, strive to maximize the damage inflicted to the system
while remaining covert and not getting detected for an extended duration of time. An anomaly
detection system (ADS) can monitor the system for signatures of known attacks or for anomalies.
When an ADS detects suspicious activity, it raises an alarm, which can then be investigated by
system operators and experts. For instance, in the case of water networks, water quality sensors
continuously monitor parameters such as chlorine, pH, and turbidity. The collected data is then
analyzed by detection systems such as CANARY [56] to detect anomalous events and provide an
indication of potential contamination.
A well-known method that can be used for detecting anomalies is sequential change detection
[11]. This method considers a sequence of measurements that starts under the normal hypothesis
and then, at some point in time, changes to the anomaly hypothesis. In sequential change detection,
the detection delay is the time difference between when an anomaly occurs and when an alarm is
raised. Detection algorithms may induce false positives that are alarms raised for normal system
behavior. In general, it is desirable to reduce detection delay as much as possible while maintaining
an acceptable false-positive rate. There exists a trade-off between the detection delay and the rate
of false positives, which can be controlled by changing the sensitivity of the detector. A typical
way to control the sensitivity is by changing the detection threshold. By decreasing (increasing) the
detection threshold, a defender can decrease (increase) the detection delay and increase (decrease)
the false-positive rate. Consequently, the detection threshold must be carefully selected, since a
large value may result in large detection delays, while a small value may result in wasting resources
on investigating false alarms.
Finding an optimal threshold, which optimally balances the trade-off between detection delay
and rate of false positives is a challenging problem. The problem is exacerbated when detectors are
deployed in systems with dynamic behavior and when the expected damage incurred from unde-
tected attacks depends on the system state and time. For example, in water distribution networks,
contamination attacks at a high-demand time are more calamitous than attacks at a low-demand
time. Hence, defenders need to incorporate time-dependent information in computing optimal detec-
tion thresholds when facing strategic attackers. In dynamic systems, potential damage from attacks
changes over time, which implies that optimal thresholds must also change with time. However, if
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we have to select a different threshold for each time period, then the number of possible solutions
grows exponentially with the time-horizon.
An adversary can attack a system in multiple ways, and each of these may cause a different
amount of damage or may be detected with a different delay. To account for these differences, at-
tack types available to the adversary must be explicitly modeled. For instance, in water-distribution
networks, potassium ferricyanide and arsenic trioxide are both chemicals that can be used to con-
taminate water. In this case, addition of a specific toxic chemical constitutes an attack type as each
chemical affects water quality in different ways and hence may cause different damage or may be
detected with different delay [55].
Contamination events may also occur due to non-malicious incidents or equipment failures. For
instance, pipe bursts and leakages can become a source of water contamination. Therefore, it is de-
sirable to design ADS that are able to quickly and accurately detect either incidental contaminations
or malicious attacks.
We study the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly-based detection in dynamical
systems in the face of strategic attacks. Our main contributions are the following:
• We formulate a two-player Stackelberg game between a defender and an adversary. We assume
that the adversary attacks the system, choosing the time and type of the attack (e.g., type of
harmful chemical introduced into a water-distribution network) to maximize the inflicted damage.
On the other hand, the defender selects detection thresholds to minimize both damage from
best-response attacks and the cost of false alarms.
• We present a dynamic-programming based algorithm to solve the game, thereby computing op-
timal time-dependent thresholds. We call this approach the time-dependent threshold strategy.
We analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm and show that its running time scales
polynomially as the length of the time horizon of interest increases, which is important in practice
from the perspective of scalability.
• We also provide and study a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of computing optimal
fixed thresholds, which do not change with time.
• In addition, we study the problem of finding optimal thresholds in the presence of random faults
and attacks, and present an algorithm that computes the optimal thresholds. The running time
of the algorithm scales polynomially as the length of the time horizon of interest increases.
• Finally, we evaluate and apply our results to the detection of contamination attacks in a water-
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distribution system as a case study. Since expected damage to the system by an attack is time-
dependent as water demand changes throughout the day, the time-dependent threshold strategy
can achieve much lower losses than a fixed-threshold strategy. Our simulation results confirm this,
showing that time-dependent thresholds significantly outperform fixed ones.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss related work. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we introduce the system model. In Section 3.4, we present the game-theoretic model and
define the problem of computing optimal time-dependent detection thresholds. In Section 3.5, we
analyze the time-dependent detection strategy and present an algorithm to obtain optimal thresh-
olds. We also provide an algorithm to compute optimal fixed thresholds, which do not change with
time. In Section 3.6, we present the problem of computing optimal time-dependent thresholds in
the presence of both faults and attacks, and we present an algorithm to solve the problem. In Sec-
tion 3.7, we evaluate our algorithm using a case study of contamination attacks in water distribution
systems. Finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 3.8.
3.2 Related Work
As discussed in Chapter 2, the problem of optimal design of anomaly detection systems has been
studied in a variety of different ways in the academic literature [132, 29]. Nevertheless, to the best of
our knowledge, prior work has not particularly addressed the optimal threshold selection problem in
the face of strategic attacks when the damage corresponding to an attack depends on time-varying
properties of the underlying system.
Change detection methods with adaptive thresholds have been previously used. An extension of
CUSUM test that can be configured at run-time is proposed in [2]. The paper discusses methods
to configure the detector’s parameters, and shows how the detector performs when the correct
configuration is not known a priori. Further, a procedure to obtain adaptive thresholds for CUSUM-
type detectors is presented that takes into account non-stationary nature of the stochastic systems
under supervision [136]. The proposed method outperforms fixed threshold in obtaining desired
rate of false alarms. Finally, an adaptive CUSUM control chart is presented that uses variable
sampling intervals [88]. The method is shown to perform better than the fixed sampling interval
approach. Nonetheless, unlike our work, these studies fail to address dependencies between the
detector’s performance and dynamic properties of a system that can be maliciously exploited by
strategic adversaries.
In a game-theoretic setting, signaling games have been used to model intrusion detection [109, 40].
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An intrusion detection game based on a signaling game is proposed in order to select the optimal
detection strategy that lowers resource consumption [121]. Further, distributed intrusion detection
is studied as a game between an IDS and an attacker using a model that represents the flow of
information from the attacker to the IDS [3, 4]. The work investigates the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium and best-response strategies. Nevertheless, the IDS models used in these works
are significantly different from the ones used in our work (i.e., anomaly-based change detection).
Another related game-theoretic setting is FlipIt game [134, 73]. FlipIt is an attacker-defender game
that studies the problem of stealthy takeover of control over a critical resource, in which the players
receive benefits proportional to the total time that they control the resource. A framework for
the interaction between an attacker, defender, and a cloud-connected device is presented in [110].
The interactions are described using a combination of a FlipIt game and a signaling game. What
distinguishes our work from FlipIt is using an anomaly detector that has detection delay and false
alarms.
Contaminant intrusion in water distribution network has been considered in water security lit-
erature [34, 35]. In particular, data-driven water monitoring approaches have received considerable
attention due to the advances in smart monitoring technologies [94, 65]. Bayesian sequential analy-
sis is integrated with neural network models to detect possible quality threats in water distribution
systems [113]. Further, a dynamic thresholds scheme for contamination event detection is presented
by defining optimal detection thresholds as the ones that maximize detection rate [10]. While the
mentioned work also uses detection thresholds that change in time, the method of threshold selection
does not consider losses obtained by detection delay and false alarms. In addition, unlike our work,
it does not consider malicious adversaries that exploit time-varying aspects of WDS.
Sequential change detection methods such as CUSUM have been used to detect changes in water
quality. Combined Shewhart-CUSUM control charts are used for ground water monitoring in [49].
The study uses Shewhart control chart for identifying large changes at a single timestep in addition
to CUSUM chart for detecting small continuous changes. The method is evaluated by presenting
false-positive rate, false-negative rate, and detection delay. Further, CUSUM methods for water
quality monitoring are implemented in [90]. Considering six kinds of quality trends, the performance
of CUSUM is studied by measuring detection delay and false-negative error. It is concluded that
CUSUM performs well when used for monitoring water quality. While such studies effectively use
sequential change detection for water quality monitoring, they simply use fixed thresholds and do
not consider time-dependent thresholds. In this chapter, we showed that time-dependent thresholds
significantly outperform the fixed threshold in terms of minimizing the losses.
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Figure 3.1: System description.
3.3 System Model
We consider a system which may be attacked by an adversary. We assume a discrete-time system
model with a finite time horizon of interest denoted by {1, ..., T}. The system provides some utility
in its normal state and this utility is substantially reduced when the system is under attack. Further,
the system and – hence – these utilities may be be time-dependent. Instead of explicitly considering
these quantities, we take a general, security-focused approach and model the impact of attacks using
a time-dependent damage function D. Finally, we assume that the system is monitored by a set of
sensors and an operator can use anomaly detection based on sensor data for detecting attacks.
For example, consider a water distribution network that is monitored by sensors that measure
water quality using pH or choline levels. The system is subject to attacks such as intrusive contami-
nation with toxic chemicals [50]. The utility from supplying clean water for residential consumption
depends on the water demand, which fluctuates significantly over time. The damage caused by
a contamination attack depends on both the lack of clean water supply as well as the impact on
public health of the population exposed to contaminated water. Water quality sensors may be used
to detect anomalies, such as changes in chemical concentrations that could be attributed to the
introduction of harmful chemicals.
Our primary goal is to address the problem of finding optimal time-dependent configurations for
anomaly detection algorithms. Table 3.1 shows a list of symbols used in this chapter. In addition,
Figure 3.1 shows a high level overview of the system model, whose elements will be detailed in the
following subsections.
Attack Model. Adversaries may compromise the system through an attack of type λ ∈ Λ (e.g.,
type of harmful chemical introduced into a water-distribution network). The attack starts at time
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Table 3.1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
T cardinality of time horizon of interest
η vector of time-dependent threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1
Λ set of attack types
D(k, λ) expected damage caused by an attack of type λ ∈ Λ at timestep k
δ(ηk, λ) detection delay given detection threshold ηk and attack type λ
FP (ηk) false alarm probability given detection threshold ηk
Cf cost of false alarms
Cd cost of changing the detection threshold
P(η, ka, λ) attacker’s payoff for time-dependent threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 and attack (ka, λ)
L(η, ka, λ) defender’s loss for threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 and attack (ka, λ)
E set of thresholds corresponding to set of possible detection delays ∆
PF (η) defender’s loss for time-dependent threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 due to random faults
LC(η, ka, λ) defender’s loss for threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 due to random faults and attack (ka, λ)
ka and ends at ke, thus spanning the interval [ka, ke]. If an attack remains undetected, it will enable
the attacker to cause physical or financial damage. In order to represent the tight relation between
the system’s dynamic behavior and the expected loss incurred from undetected attacks, we model
the potential damage of an attack as a function of time.
Definition 1 (Expected Damage Function). The damage function of a system is a function D :
{1, ..., T} × Λ → R+ which represents the expected damage D(k, λ) incurred by the system from an
undetected attack of type λ ∈ Λ at time k ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Detector. We consider a defender whose objective is to protect the system using anomaly detection
based on the sensor measurements. The detector’s goal is to determine whether a sequence of received
measurements corresponds to normal behavior or an attack. Although the proposed approach can be
used for various detection algorithms, we consider a widely used method known as sequential change
detection [11]. This method assumes a sequence of measurements that starts under the normal
hypothesis, and then, at some point in time, changes to the attack hypothesis. Change detection
attempts to detect this change as soon as possible. Examples of change detection algorithms are
geometric moving average, generalized likelihood ratio (GLR), and cumulative sum (CUSUM) [11].
The performance of change detectors is characterized by the detection delay, which is the time
between the beginning of an attack and the time when an alarm is raised, and the false-positive
probability, which is the probability of raising an alarm when there has been no attack. In general,
it is desirable to reduce detection delay while maintaining an acceptable false-positive probability.
26
However, there exists a trade-off between the detection delay and the probability of false positives,
which can be controlled by changing the detection threshold. In particular, by decreasing (increasing)
the detection threshold, a defender can decrease (increase) the detection delay and increase (decrease)
the false-positive probability. Finding the optimal trade-off and its corresponding optimal threshold
is an important problem since the damage from an attack depends on the performance of the detector.
The time-dependent threshold is denoted by η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 and the detection delay by δ : R+ ×
Λ → N ∪ {0}, where δ(ηk, λ) is the detection delay (in timesteps) when the threshold is ηk and
the type of the attack is λ ∈ Λ. We assume that for each λ ∈ Λ, δ(ηk, λ) is a continuous function
of ηk. Further, we denote the false-positive probability (i.e., probability of raising a false alarm
during a single timestep) by FP : R+ → [0, 1], where FP (ηk) is the false-positive probability when
the detection threshold is ηk. We assume that FP is decreasing and δ is increasing with respect to
ηk, which is true for most typical detectors, including sequential change detectors. For example, in
Section 3.7, we obtain detection delay and false-positive probability for a CUSUM detector.
3.4 Problem Statement
In this section, we present the optimal threshold selection problem. We consider the case in which
the defender selects time-dependent thresholds for the anomaly detection. We model this problem
as a conflict between a defender and an attacker, which is formulated as a two-player Stackelberg
security game.
The idea of time-dependent threshold is to reduce the detector’s sensitivity during less critical
periods (via increasing the threshold) and increase the sensitivity during more critical periods (via
decreasing the threshold). As we will show, this significantly decreases the loss corresponding to
false alarms. However, the defender may not want to continuously change the threshold, since a
threshold change requires a reconfiguration of the detector that has a cost. Hence, the defender
needs to find an optimal threshold, which is a balance between continuously changing the threshold
and keeping it fixed.
3.4.1 Defender’s Loss and Attacker’s Payoff.
The defender’s strategic choice is to select the threshold η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1 for each timestep. We consider
a worst-case attacker who will not stop the attack before detection in order to maximize the damage.
Consequently, the attacker’s strategic choice becomes to select an attack type λ and a time ka to
start the attack.
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Since our work focuses on optimizing detection delay, we consider damage arising from attacks
only during the time they remain undetected. In other words, we consider the impact of an attack
from its beginning until its detection. We define the detection time σ(η, ka, λ) of an attack of type λ
that starts at ka as the first timestep in which an alarm is raised due to the attack. Since an alarm
is raised in timestep k for an attack of type λ that started at ka if and only if δ(ηk, λ) ≤ k− ka, the
detection time of an attack is
σ(η, ka, λ) = {min k | δ(ηk, λ) ≤ k − ka} .
Note that the equation above represents the timestep at which the attack is first detected, and not
the detection delay.
For the strategies (η, ka, λ), the attacker’s payoff is the total damage until the expected detection
time,
P(η, ka, λ) =
σ(η,ka,λ)∑
k=ka
D(k, λ) , (3.1)
that is, the total damage incurred by the system until the expected detection time. This payoff
function assumes a worst-case attacker that has the goal of maximizing the damage.
If an alarm is raised, the defender needs to investigate the system to determine whether an
attack has actually occurred or not, which will cost Cf . Further, let Cd be the cost associated
with each threshold change. The number of threshold changes is described by N = |Γ|, where
Γ = {k | ηk 6= ηk+1, k ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}}. When the defender selects a time-dependent threshold η,
and the attacker starts the attack at a timestep ka, the defender’s loss (i.e., inverse payoff) is
L(η, ka, λ) = N · Cd +
T∑
k=1
Cf · FP (ηk) +
σ(η,ka,λ)∑
k=ka
D(k, λ) , (3.2)
that is, the amount of resources spent on changing the threshold, operational costs of manually
investigating false alarms, and the expected amount of damage caused by the attack before its
detection.
3.4.2 Best-Response Attack and Optimal Threshold.
We assume that the attacker has complete and perfect information, and will play a best-response
attack to the defender’s strategy as defined below.
Definition 2 (Best-Response Attack). Assuming a defender’s strategy, the attacker’s strategy is a
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best-response if it maximizes the attacker’s payoff. Formally, an attack (ka, λ) is a best-response
given a defense strategy η if it maximizes P(η, ka, λ) as defined in (3.1).
Further, the defender must choose his strategy expecting that the attacker will play a best-
response or uniformly random attack. We formulate the defender’s optimal strategy as a strong
Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE), which is commonly used in the security literature for solving Stack-
elberg games [66].
Definition 3 (Optimal Thresholds). We call a defense strategy optimal if it minimizes the de-
fender’s loss given that the attacker always plays a best-response with tie-breaking in favor of the
defender. Formally, an optimal defense is
argmin
η,
(ka,λ)∈bestResponses(η)
L(η, ka, λ), (3.3)
where bestResponses(η) are the best-response attacks against η.
Our objective is to compute the optimal thresholds efficiently.
3.5 Selection of Optimal Thresholds
In this section, we present an approach for computing optimal thresholds for any instance of the
attacker-defender game, based on the SSE. The approach consists of two steps: 1) a dynamic-
programming algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) for finding minimum-cost thresholds subject to the con-
straint that the damage caused by a best-response attack is lower than or equal to a given damage
bound and 2) an exhaustive-search algorithm (Algorithm 3.2) that finds an optimal damage bound
and thereby optimal thresholds.
Let ∆ denote the set of all possible detection delay values:
∆ =
{
m ∈ {1, . . . , T} ∣∣ ∃λ ∈ Λ, η ∈ R+ [m = δ(η, λ)]} .
In other words, ∆ is the set of all delay values between 1 and T that can be attained by some
threshold η for some attack type λ.
Next, let E be the set of maximal threshold values that attain the delay values ∆:
E =
{
η∗
∣∣∣∣ ∃λ ∈ Λ,m ∈ ∆ [η∗ = maxη : δ(η,λ)≤m η
]}
.
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Algorithm 3.1 MinimumCostThresholds(P )
1: ∀ m ∈ ∆|Λ|, η ∈ E : Cost(T + 1,m, η)← 0
2: for n = T, . . . , 1 do
3: for all m ∈ ∆|Λ| do
4: for all ηprev ∈ E do
5: if
∨
λ∈Λ
(∑n
k=n−mλ D(k, λ) > P
)
then
6: Cost(n,m, ηprev)←∞
7: else
8: for all η ∈ E do
9: if ηprev = η ∨ n = 1 then
10: S(n,m, ηprev, η)← Cost(n+ 1, 〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ, η) + Cf · FP (η)
11: else
12: S(n,m, ηprev, η)←Cost(n+ 1, 〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ, η)+ Cf · FP (η)+Cd
13: end if
14: end for
15: η∗(n,m, ηprev)← argminη S(n,m, ηprev, η)
16: Cost(n,m, ηprev)← minη S(n,m, ηprev, η)
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: end for
21: m← 〈0, . . . , 0〉, η∗0 ← arbitrary
22: for all n = 1, . . . T do
23: η∗n ← η∗(n,m, η∗n−1)
24: m← 〈min{δ(η∗n, λ),mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ
25: end for
26: return (Cost(1, 〈0, . . . , 0〉, arbitrary),η∗)
Algorithm 3.2 OptimalThresholds
1: SearchSpace←
{∑ka+δ
k=ka
D(k, λ)
∣∣∣∃ ka ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, δ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ Λ}
2: for all P ∈ SearchSpace do
3: (TC(P ),η∗(P ))←MinimumCostThresholds(P )
4: end for
5: P ∗ ← argminP ∈SearchSpace TC(P )
6: return η∗(P ∗)
Introducing the set E enables us to restrict the strategy set of the defender to a discrete set. The
following lemma shows that the defender can always find optimal thresholds by considering only
threshold values from the set E.
Theorem 1. Given an instance of our game, there exist optimal thresholds η such that
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , T} : ηk ∈ E.
Proof. Given an instance of the Stackelberg game, let η be optimal thresholds that do not necessarily
satisfy the constraint of the lemma. Then, construct thresholds η∗ that satisfy the constraint by
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replacing each ηk with η
∗
k = maxη : δ(η,λ)≤ δ(ηk,λ) η. For any attack (ka, λ), the detection delay and
hence the expected damage are the same for η and η∗. Consequently, the damage caused by best-
response attacks must also be the same for η and η∗. Further, the defender’s costs for η are greater
than or equal to those for η∗ since 1) for every k, ηk ≤ η∗k and FP is decreasing, and 2) the number
of threshold changes in η is greater than or equal to that in η∗. Therefore, η∗ is optimal, which
concludes our proof.
Consequently, for the remainder of this chapter, we will consider only strategies in which every
threshold ηk is chosen from the set E.
Next, we present the algorithm for computing the optimal thresholds. The dynamic-programming
algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) finds minimum-cost thresholds subject to the constraint that the damage
caused by a best-response attack is lower than or equal to a given damage bound P . The exhaustive
search (Algorithm 3.2) computes the optimal thresholds by finding an optimal damage bound P
and using Algorithm 3.1. In the first algorithm, we use a dynamic-programming approach, iterating
backwards through the timesteps. For each timestep, we assume that the optimal thresholds for the
remaining timesteps (under certain conditions) have already been computed, and we compute the
optimal threshold for the current timestep in polynomial-time. In the second algorithm, we use an
exhaustive search but we show that the cardinality of our search space is polynomial in the size of
the input.
Lemma 1. For any given damage bound P ∈ R, Algorithm 3.1 computes thresholds η = 〈ηk〉Tk=1
that minimize
N · Cd +
T∑
k=1
Cf · FP (ηk)
subject to
∀ka ∈ {1, . . . , T}, λ ∈ Λ : P(η, ka, λ) ≤ P . (3.4)
The algorithm returns the minimum cost attained, or if no thresholds exist satisfying (3.4), it returns
infinity as the cost.
Proof. We assume that we are given a damage bound P , and we have to find thresholds that
minimize the total cost of false positives and threshold changes, subject to the constraint that any
attack against these thresholds will result in at most P damage. In order to solve this problem,
we use a dynamic-programming algorithm. We will first discuss the algorithm without a cost for
changing thresholds, and then show how to extend it to consider costly threshold changes.
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We let ∆|Λ| denote the Cartesian power ∆×∆× . . .×∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Λ|
of the set ∆. For any two variables
n ∈ {1, . . . , T} and m ∈ ∆|Λ| such that ∀λ ∈ Λ : 0 ≤ mλ < n, we define Cost(n,m) to be the
minimum cost of false positives from n to T subject to the damage bound P , given that attacks of
type λ can start at ka ∈ {n −mλ, . . . , T} and they are not detected prior to n. Formally, we can
define Cost(n,m) as
min
(ηn,...,ηT )
T∑
k=n
Cf · FP (ηk) (3.5)
subject to
∀λ ∈ Λ, ka ∈ {n−mλ, . . . , T} :
min
i : i≥n∧ δ(ηi,λ)≤i−ka
i∑
k=ka
D(k, λ) ≤ P.
If there are no thresholds that satisfy the damage bound P under these conditions, we letCost(n,m)
be ∞.1
We can recursively compute Cost(n,m) as follows. Firstly, for any n and m, if there exists an
attack type λ such that
∑n
k=n−mλ D(k, λ) > P , then an attack of type λ starting at time n−mλ will
cause greater than P damage, regardless of the thresholds ηn, . . . , ηT . Consequently, in this case, we
can immediately set Cost(n,m) to ∞.
Otherwise, we iterate over all possible threshold values η ∈ E, and choose the one that minimizes
the cost Cost(n,m). For any threshold η, we can compute the resulting cost as follows. If δ(η, λ) >
mλ, then no attack of type λ would be detected at time n, so we would have to increase mλ for the
next timestep n + 1. On the other hand, if δ(η, λ) ≤ mλ, then attacks starting at time n − δ(η, λ)
or earlier would be detected at time n, so we would have to decrease mλ to δ(η, λ) for the next
timestep n+1. Hence, if we selected threshold η for timestep n, then we would have to update m to
〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ+1}〉λ∈Λ for the next timestep. Therefore, if we selected threshold η for timestep n,
then the attained cost would be the sum of the cost Cf ·FP (η) for timestep n and the best possible
cost Cost(n+1, 〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ+1}〉λ∈Λ) for the remaining timesteps. By combining this formula
with the rule for assigning infinite cost, we can compute Cost(n,m) as
Cost(n,m) =
∞ if ∨λ∈Λ∑nk=n−mλ D(k, λ) > P,
minη Cost(n+ 1, 〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ) + Cf · FP (η) otherwise.
(3.6)
1Note that in practice, ∞ can be represented by a sufficiently high natural number.
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Note that in the equation above, Cost(n,m) does not depend on η1, . . . , ηn−1, it depends only
on the feasible thresholds for the subsequent timesteps. Therefore, starting from the last timestep
T and iterating backwards, we are able to compute Cost(n,m) for all timesteps n and all values
m. Finally, for n = T and any m, computing Cost(T,m) is straightforward: if the damage from
m does not exceed the threshold P for any attack type λ, then Cost(T,m) = minη∈E Cf · FP (η);
otherwise, Cost(T,m) =∞.
Having found Cost(n,m) for all n and m, by definition, Cost(1, 〈0, . . . , 0〉) is the minimum
cost of false positives subject to the damage bound P . The minimizing threshold values can be
recovered by iterating forward from n = 1 to T and again using Equation (3.6). That is, for every
n, we select the threshold value η∗n that attains the minimum cost Cost(n,m), where m can easily
be computed from the preceding threshold values η∗1 , . . . , η
∗
n−1.
2
Costly Threshold Changes. Now, we show how to extend the computation of Cost to consider
the cost Cd of changing the threshold. Let Cost(n,m, ηprev) be the minimum cost for timesteps
starting from n subject to the same constraints as before but also given that the threshold value
in timestep n − 1 (i.e., the previous timestep) is ηprev. Then, Cost(n,m, ηprev) can be computed
similarly to Cost(n,m): for any n < T , iterate over all possible threshold values η, and choose
the one that results in the lowest cost Cost(n,m, ηprev). If ηprev = η or if n = 1, then the cost is
computed the same way as in the previous case (i.e., similar to Equation (3.6)). Otherwise, the cost
also has to include the cost Cd of changing the threshold. Consequently, we first define
S(n, m, ηprev, η) =

Cost(n+ 1, 〈min{δ(η, λ) ,mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ) + Cf · FP (η) if η ∈ {ηprev, 1},
Cost(n+ 1, 〈min{δ(η, λ),mλ+ 1}〉λ∈Λ) + Cf · FP (η) + Cd otherwise.
Then, similar to Equation (3.6), we can express the optimal cost as
Cost(n,m, ηprev) =

∞ if ∨λ∈Λ∑nk=n−mλ D(k, λ) > P,
minη S(n,m, ηprev, η) otherwise.
Note that for n = 1, we do not add the cost Cd of changing the threshold. Similarly to the
previous case, Cost(1, 0, arbitrary) is the minimum cost subject to the damage bound P , and the
minimizing thresholds can be recovered by iterating forward.
2Note that in Algorithm 3.1, we store the minimizing values η∗(n,m) for every n and m when iterating backwards,
thereby decreasing running time and simplifying the presentation of our algorithm.
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Next, we show how Algorithm 3.2 finds optimal thresholds.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3.2 computes optimal thresholds that minimize the defender’s loss (see
Definition 3).
Proof. For any damage bound P , using the algorithm MinimumCostThresholds (Algorithm 3.1),
we can find thresholds that minimize the total cost of false positives and threshold changes, which
we will denote by TC(P ), subject to the constraint that an attack can cause at most P damage.
Since the defender’s loss is the sum of its total cost and the damage resulting from a best-response
attack, we can find optimal thresholds by solving
min
P
TC(P ) + P (3.7)
and computing the optimal thresholds η∗ for the minimizing P ∗ using our dynamic-programming
algorithm.
To show that this formulation does indeed solve the problem of finding optimal thresholds, we
use indirect proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist thresholds η′ for which
the defender’s loss L′ is lower than the loss L∗ for the solution η∗ of the above formulation. Let P ′
be the damage resulting from the attacker’s best-response against η′, and let TC ′ be the defender’s
total cost for η′. Since the best-response attack against η′ achieves at most P ′ damage, we have
from the definition of TC(P ) that TC ′ ≥ TC(P ′). It also follows from the definition of TC(P ) that
L∗ ≤ TC(P ∗) + P ∗. Combining the above with our supposition L∗ > L′, we get
TC(P ∗) + P ∗ ≥ L∗ > L′ = TC ′ + P ′ ≥ TC(P ′) + P ′.
However, this is a contradiction since P ∗ minimizes TC(P ) +P by definition. Therefore, thresholds
η∗ must be optimal.
It remains to show that Algorithm 3.2 finds an optimal damage bound P ∗. To this end, we show
that P ∗ can be found using an exhaustive search over a set, whose cardinality is polynomial in the
size of the problem instance. Consider the set of damage values resulting from all possible attack
scenarios ka ∈ T , δ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ Λ, that is, the set
{
ka+δ∑
k=ka
D(λ, k)
∣∣∣∣∣∃ ka ∈ {1, . . . , T}, δ ∈ ∆, λ ∈ Λ
}
. (3.8)
Let the elements of this set be denoted by P1, P2, . . . in increasing order. It is easy to see that for
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any i, the set of thresholds that satisfy the damage constraint is the same for every damage value
P ∈ [Pi, Pi+1). Hence, for any i, the cost TC(P ) is the same for every P ∈ [Pi, Pi+1). Therefore, the
optimal P ∗ must be a damage value Pi from the above set, which we can find by simply iterating
over the set.
Proposition 1. The running time of Algorithm 3.2 is O(T 2 · |∆||Λ|+2 · |Λ|2 · |E|).
Note that since detection delay values can be upper-bounded by T , the running time of Algo-
rithm 3.2 is also O(T |Λ|+4 · |Λ|2 · |E|).
Proof. In the dynamic-programming algorithm (Algorithm 3.1), we first compute Cost(n,m, δn−1)
for every n ∈ {1, . . . , T}, m ∈ ∆|Λ|, and ηprev ∈ E, and each computation takes O(|E| · |Λ|) time.
Then, we recover the optimal detection delay for all timesteps {1, . . . , T}, and the computation for
each timestep takes a constant time. Consequently, the running time of the dynamic-programming
algorithm is O(T · |∆||Λ|+1 · |Λ| · |E|).
In the exhaustive search, we first enumerate all possible damage values by iterating over all
possible attacks (ka, δ, λ), where ka ∈ {1, . . . , T}, δ ∈ ∆, and λ ∈ Λ. Then, for each possible damage
value, we execute the dynamic-programming algorithm, which takes O(T · |∆||Λ|+1 · |Λ| · |E|) time.
Consequently, the running time of Algorithm 3.2 is O(T 2 · |∆||Λ|+2 · |Λ|2 · |E|).
Finally, note that the running time of the algorithm can be substantially reduced in practice by
computing Cost in a lazy manner. Starting from n = 1 and m = 〈0, . . . , 0〉, we can compute and
store the value of each Cost(n,m, δprev) only when it is referenced, and then reuse it when it is
referenced again.
3.5.1 Fixed Detection Thresholds
We also present an efficient polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal threshold for the
special case when the threshold is fixed for the time horizon {1, . . . , T}. In this case, a detection
threshold is chosen and is kept fixed. Detectors with fixed threshold are widely used in practice and
are advantageous when it is not possible to change the threshold due to operational restrictions.
To compute an optimal fixed threshold, we present Algorithm 3.3. The algorithm iterates over all
possible threshold values η ∈ E and selects one that minimizes the defender’s loss considering a
best-response attack. Given a threshold η, to find a best-response attack (ka, λ), the algorithm
iterates over all possible pairs of (ka, λ), and selects one that maximizes the payoff.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 3.3 computes an optimal fixed threshold in O(T · |E| · |Λ|) steps.
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Algorithm 3.3 Optimal Fixed Threshold
Input: D(k, λ), T , Cf
Initialize: L∗ ←∞
1: for all η ∈ E do
2: P ′ ← 0
3: for all λ ∈ Λ do
4: for all ka ∈ {1, . . . , T} do
5: P (η, ka, λ)←
∑ka+δ(η,λ)
ka
D(k, λ)
6: if P(η, ka, λ) > P ′ then
7: P ′ ← P(η, ka, λ)
8: L′ ← P ′ + Cf · FP (η) · T
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: if L′ < L∗ then
13: L∗ ← L′
14: η∗ ← η
15: end if
16: end for
Proof. The obtained threshold is optimal since the algorithm evaluates all possible solutions through
exhaustive search. Given a tuple (η, ka, λ), when computing the attacker’s payoff P(η, ka, λ), we use
the payoff computed in previous iteration, which takes constant time. We repeat these steps for
each attack type λ ∈ Λ. Therefore, the running time of the algorithm is O(T · |E| · |Λ|).
3.6 Optimal Thresholds in the Presence of Faults and Attacks
In this section, we modify our game to take into account random faults and attacks. This is motivated
by the fact that contamination may also occur due to non-malicious incidents such as pipe bursts
and leakages. Therefore, it is desirable to design anomaly detectors that are able to quickly and
accurately detect either random faults or attacks. We formally define random faults as follows.
Definition 4 (Random Fault). A random fault is represented by (ka, λ) where ka and λ are randomly
selected from uniform distributions over {1, . . . , T} and Λ.
The expected loss from random faults, denoted by PF (η) is the mean of the losses, that is
PF (η) = 1
T · |Λ|
T∑
ka=1
∑
λ∈Λ
σ(η,ka,λ)∑
k=ka
D(k, λ). (3.9)
Then, the combined loss due to faults and attacks can be represented as the average of the
loss (3.9) due to random faults and the loss (3.1) due to attacks. Therefore, the defender’s total loss
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with both random faults and best-response attacks is
LC(η, ka, λ) = N(η) · Cd +
T∑
k=1
Cf · FP (ηk) + 1
2
(PF (η) + P(η, ka, λ)) (3.10)
As before, the defender’s problem is to find the thresholds that minimize the loss, that is
argmin
η,
(ka,λ)∈bestResponses(η)
LC(η, ka, λ),
Algorithm. First, we define the following subproblem, given that P is a real number.
TCC(P ) = min
η
N(η) · Cd +
T∑
k=1
Cf · FP (ηk) + 1
2
· 1
T · |Λ|
T∑
k′a=1
∑
λ′∈Λ
σ(η,k′a,λ
′)∑
k=k′a
D(k, λ′)
subject to
∀ka, λ : 1
2
σ(η,ka,λ)∑
k=ka
D(k, λ) ≤ P,
We let TCC(P ) =∞ if there exist no ka and λ that would satisfy the constraint of TCC(P ). Then,
using the same argument presented in Theorem 2, we can find optimal thresholds by solving,
min
P
TCC(P ) + P, (3.11)
and an optimal solution η∗ to TCC(P ) for an optimal P is also an optimal solution to (3.11).
To solve TCC(P ), we define the following sub-subproblem.
Cost(P, n,m, ηn−1) = min
ηn,ηn+1,...,ηT
N(〈ηn−1, ηn, . . . , ηT 〉) · Cd +
T∑
k=n
Cf · FP (ηk)
+
1
2
1
T · |Λ|
∑
λ′∈Λ
T∑
k′a=n−mλ′
σ(η,k′a,λ
′)∑
k=n
D(k, λ′)
subject to
∀λ, ka ∈{n−mλ, . . . , T} :
min{i | i≥n∧ δ(ηi,λ)≤i−ka}∑
k=ka
1
2
D(k, λ) ≤ P,
where P is a real number, n ∈ {1, . . . , T}, m is a |Λ|-element vector of natural numbers, and
ηn−1 ∈ E.
Clearly, we have TCC(P ) = Cost(P, 1, (0, . . . , 0), ηn−1) for any ηn−1, and an optimal solution to
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Cost is also an optimal solution to TCC .
Finally, we show that we can solve Cost using dynamic programming. We let Cost(P, n,m, ηn−1) =
∞ if there exist no ηn, ηn+1, . . . , ηT that would satisfy the constraint of Cost(P, n,m, ηn−1). Then,
we can break down the computation of Cost as,
Cost(P, n,m, ηn−1) =
∞ if ∨λ 12 ∑nk=n−mλ D(k, λ) > P,
minηn Cost(P, n+ 1, 〈min{δ(ηn, λ),mλ + 1}〉λ∈Λ, ηn) + 1{ηn−1 6=ηn}Cd
+Cf · FP (ηn) + 12 1T ·|Λ|
∑
λ′∈Λ
∑T
k′a=n−mλ′ 1{n≥σ(η,k′a,λ′)}D(k, λ′)
otherwise.
(3.12)
where 1x is equal to 1 if x is true, and 0 otherwise. The correctness of the reduction follows from
the same argument that was presented in Lemma 1.
3.7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our approach numerically using a case study of detecting contamination
attacks in water distribution systems. Ensuring the supply of clean and safe drinking water is manda-
tory for any water infrastructure. This requires continuous monitoring of water quality parameters
and assessing the sensor measurements for any intrusive (or non-intrusive) contamination.
3.7.1 System Model
We consider a water distribution system (WDS) and a malicious adversary who attempts to penetrate
the system through one of many entry points, such as hydrant and connections, and contaminate
the water with toxic chemicals [50]. To model normal behavior, we use data collected by a utility in
the United States available at [25]. The data contains water quality measurements at a resolution
of ten minutes spanning six weeks (i.e., 6048 time steps). All measurements are taken under normal
conditions and include the following water quality parameters: Total chlorine, electrical conductivity
(EC), pH, total organic carbon (TOC), and turbidity3. We divide the data into two subsets, 67%
for training and 33% for testing. The training subset is used to construct an estimator used in the
detector. The testing subset is used to imitate real-time operation and to evaluate the detector by
3Studies on the response of water quality sensors to chemical and biological loads have shown that free chlorine,
total organic carbon (TOC), electrical conductivity, and chloride are among the most reactive parameters to water
contaminants [55].
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considering contamination attacks.
3.7.1.1 Contamination Attack.
We simulate contamination attacks using the approach presented in [65, 94]. For each water quality
parameter i, the data collected from the water quality sensors is normalized by subtracting the
dataset mean µi from each water quality measurement xi(k), and dividing this difference by the
standard deviation σi of the dataset, i.e., zi(k) =
xi(k)−µi
σi
. Then, contamination attacks, which are
characterized by their magnitude, are simulated and superimposed in the normal data. That is, for
an attack of magnitude λi, where λi ≥ 1, we multiply zi(k) by λi. Then, we denormalize (i.e., return
to original scale) the data via multiplying λi · zi(k) by σi and adding µi to the result. Note that
this is a typical method of generating contamination events [113]. These mentioned magnitudes can
represent the sensitivity of a quality parameter to different toxic chemicals, where a large magnitude
means the quality parameter is highly sensitive to the specific chemical. A list of toxic chemicals
and their impact on different quality parameters can be found in [55].
3.7.1.2 Damage Function.
Figure 3.2 presents a typical water demand during a day [92]. Since demand is time-dependent,
expected damage caused by contamination attacks, e.g., exposed population and volume of contam-
inated water, is also time-dependent. That is, expected disruptions at a high-demand time would
cause higher damage than disruptions at a low-demand time. To model the damage function, we
consider the finite horizon to be a single day divided into 10 min intervals (i.e., T = {1, ..., 144}).
Then, for each timestep k ∈ T , we define the expected damage as D(k, λ) = (λ − 1) · d(k), where
d(k) ∈ [0, 1] is the demand ratio at time k and λ− 1 is the added attack magnitude.
3.7.2 Detector Model
The detector comprises two parts: 1) An estimator, which estimates a relation between the water
quality parameters during normal operation, and 2) a detection algorithm, which identifies whether
an attack has occurred in the system.
3.7.2.1 Estimator.
We construct an estimator using an artificial neural network (ANN) for each water quality param-
eter [113]. For each parameter, the inputs to its corresponding ANN are the parameter’s lagged
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Figure 3.2: Hourly water demand during a day [92].
Table 3.2: Model Assessment on Test Data
Chl. EC pH Temp. TOC Turb.
R2 0.939 0.980 0.967 0.344 0.920 0.538
MSE 0.003 14.639 0.001 10.3 0.002 0.000
measurements and current measurements of all the other quality parameters. Formally, we have
zˆi(k) = f(zi(k − 1), z−i(k)), where zˆi(k) and zi(k) are, respectively, the estimated and measured
values of water parameter i at timestep k, and f is a function attained by the artificial neural net-
work. The estimated values are used to calculate the residuals, which are defined as the difference
between the measured and estimated values, denoted by ri(k) = zi(k) − zˆi(k), where ri(k) is the
residual signal for parameter i at timestep k.
Six neural networks, one for each water quality parameter, are trained. A feed-forward back-
propagation network with twenty neurons in the hidden layer is used, and the network is trained
using scikit-learn 0.18.1 library with tan-sigmoid transfer function in the hidden layer and linear
transfer function in the output layer [111]. Table 3.2 shows the estimator’s performance using mean
squared error (MSE) and coefficient of determination (R2) as performance criteria.
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3.7.2.2 Detection Algorithm.
We use the CUSUM method as the detection algorithm. CUSUM is a sequential algorithm frequently
used for change detection [105, 136]. The CUSUM statistic S(k) is described by S(k) = (S(k− 1) +
r(k) − b)+, where S(0) = 0, (a)+ = a if a ≥ 0 and zero otherwise, r(k) is a residual difference
between expected and measured sensor values generated by an estimator such that under normal
behavior it has expected value of zero, and b ∈ R+ is a small constant. Assigning ηk as the detection
threshold selected based on a desired false-alarm probability, the decision rule is defined as
d(S(k)) =
 Attack if S(k) > ηkNormal otherwise.
As discussed in Section 3.3, for each attack type (characterized by attack magnitude in this case),
there exists a trade-off between the false-positive probability and detection delay, which depends on
the detection threshold. To obtain the trade-off curve for an attack magnitude, we simulate attacks
for various threshold values with randomly chosen start times, and then measure the detection delay
values. For each threshold value, we perform 1,000 simulations and compute the average detection
delay. Next, using the same threshold, we simulate the system under normal operation and measure
the false-positive probability. By varying the threshold and repeating these steps for all attack
magnitudes, we derive the attainable detection delays and false alarm probabilities.
We consider six attack magnitudes λ ∈ {1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5}. We select b = 0.01 for the CUSUM
detector in order to allow small displacements to be detected quickly. Our results for a water quality
parameter (total chlorine) are demonstrated in the trade-off curve shown in Figure 3.3, which defines
the false-positive probability that can be obtained as a function of the corresponding detection delay.
The results confirm that the detection delay is proportional to the threshold, and the false positive
rate is inversely proportional to the threshold. Further, it can be observed that as the absolute value
of attack magnitude increases, the detection delay decreases.
3.7.3 Optimal Thresholds
The objective is to select the strategy that minimizes the defender’s loss while assuming that the
attacker responds using a best-response attack, which is characterized by its magnitude and start
time. We let Cf = 10 and Cd = 1, and use Algorithm 3.2 to compute the optimal time-dependent
threshold. Figure 3.4 shows the obtained thresholds for each timestep. The resulting optimal loss is
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Figure 3.3: Trade-off between detection delay and false-positive probability (total chlorine).
L∗ = 187.72 . Figure 3.4 shows the corresponding best-response attack. The best-response attack
has the magnitude λ = 5 and starts at ka = 116. The attack is detected 4 timesteps later and
attains the payoff P∗ = ∑120k=116D(k, λ) = 120.00. The figure also demonstrates that the detection
threshold decreases as the system experiences high-demand, so that the attacks can be detected
early enough. On the other hand, as the system experiences low-demand, the threshold increases to
have fewer false alarms.
We also compute the optimal fixed threshold in order to compare with the time-dependent
thresholds. In this case, we obtain the optimal fixed threshold η∗ = 0.90 and the optimal loss
L∗ = 222.45. Figure 3.5 shows the best-response attack corresponding to this threshold. The best-
response attack has the magnitude λ = 4 and starts at k∗a = 44. The attack is detected 6 timesteps
later and attains the payoff P∗ = ∑44+6k=44D(k, λ) = 144.00. Note that if the attacker starts the attack
at any other timestep, the damage caused before detection is less than P∗. We observe that the
optimal loss obtained by the time-dependent threshold is significantly smaller than the loss obtained
by the fixed threshold.
3.7.3.1 Simulation Results.
We test the optimal thresholds by performing simulations that imitate realistic operation. Using our
dataset, we run 42 simulations, with each of them representing a single day. We consider scenarios
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Figure 3.4: Best-response attack against the optimal time-dependent threshold has the magnitude
λ = 5 and starts at ka = 116.
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Figure 3.5: Best-response attack against the optimal fixed threshold has the magnitude λ = 4 and
starts at ka = 44.
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Table 3.3: Simulation Results
Loss Payoff Delay Number of FPs
Mean 195.83 110.29 3.71 5.60
STD 4.66 8.87 0.31 0.25
MSE 87.04 127.99 0.12 0.43
where the defender selects the optimal thresholds for the detector, and then the adversary attacks
the system using a best-response attack. In each simulation, we record the payoff attained by
the attacker and the loss incurred by the defender. Table 3.3 summarizes the simulation results.
The results show that the defender’s actual loss is very close to the optimal loss computed by the
algorithm. In particular, the relative error between the optimal loss and the mean loss is 4.26% for
the time-dependent threshold and 2.45% for the fixed threshold.
3.7.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis.
Figure 3.6 shows the optimal loss as a function of cost of threshold change Cd, when keeping cost
of false positive fixed at Cf = 10. For small values of Cd, the optimal losses obtained by the time-
dependent threshold strategy are significantly lower than the loss obtained by the fixed threshold
strategy. As the cost of threshold change Cd increases, the solutions of time-dependent and fixed
threshold problems become more similar. The time-dependent threshold solution converges to a
fixed threshold when Cd ≥ 13.50.
Figure 3.7 shows the optimal loss as a function of cost of false positives for fixed and time-
dependent threshold strategies when the cost of threshold change is fixed at Cd = 1. It can be seen
that in both cases, the optimal loss increases as the cost of false alarms increases. However, in the
case of time-dependent threshold, the change in loss is relatively smaller than the fixed threshold.
3.7.3.3 Running Time.
We now compare the running time of Algorithm 2 with an algorithm that finds the optimal thresholds
using an exhaustive search. Figure 3.8 plots the running times as a function of T (i.e., time horizon).
It can be seen that the exhaustive search algorithm has an exponential running time with respect to
T , and its running time becomes significantly high even for small values of T . This is expected as
the exhaustive search algorithm has the running time O(∆T+|Λ|). In contrast, Algorithm 2 performs
considerably better, and the running time is reasonable for all values of T .
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Figure 3.6: The defender’s loss as a function of cost of threshold change.
3.7.4 Random Faults
Figure 3.9 shows a comparison between thresholds chosen based on only attacks and combination
of either faults or attacks. For each set of thresholds, we compute two different losses, loss due
to only attacks (i.e., Equation (3.2)) and loss due to combination of either faults or attacks (i.e.,
Equation (3.10)). In the figure, we denote the thresholds obtained by considering faults and attacks
as η∗C and the thresholds obtained by considering only attacks as η
∗
A. We also let L∗C(η) be the com-
bination, i.e., (3.10), when thresholds η are selected. Similarly, we let L∗A(η) be the loss considering
only attacks, i.e., Equation(3.2), when thresholds η are selected.
We observe that L∗C(η∗C) outperforms L∗C(η∗A) and LA(η∗A) outperforms LA(η∗C). This was clearly
expected as η∗C are the optimal thresholds with respect to L∗C and η∗A are the optimal thresholds with
respect to L∗A. However, we notice that the difference between L∗C(η∗A) and L∗C(η∗C) is extremely
small, whereas the difference between L∗A(η∗A) and L∗A(η∗C) is very large. In other words, the thresh-
olds η∗C perform well only when combination of faults and attacks is considered and perform very
poorly when only attacks is considered, whereas the thresholds η∗A perform very well in both cases.
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Figure 3.7: The defender’s loss as a function of cost of false alarms.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of finding optimal detection thresholds for anomaly-based
detectors implemented in dynamical systems in the face of strategic attacks. We formulated the prob-
lem as an attacker-defender security game that determined thresholds for the detector to achieve an
optimal trade-off between the detection delay and the false-positive probabilities. To this end, we
presented a dynamic-programming based algorithm that computes optimal time-dependent thresh-
olds. We analyzed the performance of the time-dependent threshold strategy, showing that the
running time of our algorithm is polynomial in the time dimension. As a special case, we also stud-
ied and provided a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of computing optimal fixed thresholds,
which do not change with time. In addition, we studied the problem of finding optimal thresholds in
the presence of random faults and attacks, and presented an efficient algorithm that computes the
optimal thresholds. Finally, we evaluated our results using a case study of detecting contamination
attacks in a water distribution system. We showed that the optimal time-dependent thresholds
found using our algorithm significantly outperform fixed thresholds.
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Figure 3.9: The defender’s loss as a function of cost of false alarms for time-dependent thresholds.
η∗A is the optimal threshold for attacks and η
∗
C is the optimal threshold for combination of faults
and attacks.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Detection of Faulty Traffic Sensors Used in Route Planning
In a smart city, real-time traffic sensors may be deployed for various applications, such as route plan-
ning. Unfortunately, sensors are prone to failures, which result in erroneous traffic data. Erroneous
data can adversely affect applications such as route planning, and can cause increased travel time.
To minimize the impact of sensor failures, we must detect them promptly and accurately. However,
typical detection algorithms may lead to a large number of false positives (i.e., false alarms) and false
negatives (i.e., missed detections), which can result in suboptimal route planning. In this chapter,
we devise an effective detector for identifying faulty traffic sensors using a prediction model based on
Gaussian Processes. Further, we present an approach for computing the optimal parameters of the
detector which minimize losses due to false-positive and false-negative errors. We also characterize
critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the route planning application. Finally, we
implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a real-world dataset and the route planning
platform OpenTripPlanner.
4.1 Introduction
In smart cities, real-time traffic sensors may be deployed for various applications. However, sensors
are prone to failures, which result in erroneous traffic data. Erroneous data can adversely affect
the performance of applications. To minimize the impact of sensor failures, we must detect them
promptly and with high accuracy. However, typical detection algorithms may lead to a large number
of false positives and false negatives, which can result in suboptimal performance.
Anomaly detection of faulty traffic sensors has been studied in the literature. Typical approaches
include using data-driven methods that incorporate historical and real-time data to detect anomalies
[87], [146], [117], [139]. However, existing approaches may result in high performance-losses in traffic
applications, mainly due to false-positive (FP) and false-negative (FN) errors. In order to minimize
the losses, it is desirable to reduce the FP and FN rates as much as possible. But, there exists
a trade-off between them, which can be changed through a detection threshold. To address this,
it is necessary to take into account the traffic application when designing anomaly detectors, and
quantify the losses in the traffic application caused by the FP and FN errors. By selecting the right
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detection threshold, the performance losses caused by FPs and FNs can be minimized.
In this chapter, we study the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly detection of
faulty traffic sensors, considering route planning as the application of interest. The objective is to
select the optimal thresholds of anomaly detectors in order to optimize the performance of the route
planning application in the presence of faulty sensors. We devise an effective detector for identifying
faulty traffic sensors using a prediction model based on Gaussian Processes. Further, we present an
approach for computing the optimal parameters of the detector which minimize losses due to false-
positive and false-negative errors. We also characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high
impact on the traffic application. Finally, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically
using a real-world dataset and the route planning platform OpenTripPlanner [93]. Our evaluation
results show that the proposed strategy successfully minimizes the performance loss and identifies
the critical sensors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work.
In Section 3, we present the background for route planning and Gaussian Process regression. In
Section 4, we introduce the system model. In Section 5, we define a notion of optimal detection,
present a method to obtain near-optimal thresholds, and define critical sensors. In Section 6, we
implement our method and evaluate it numerically. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
4.2 Related Work
There are many papers that study traffic prediction. The work in [80] uses multivariate kernel
regression models to predict traffic flow in a network, considering route planning as the application.
In [39], the paper provides a travel time prediction algorithm in a small scale simulated network.
The work in [126] constructs robust algorithms for short-term traffic flow prediction. Finally, in [62],
classical time series approaches are used for short-term speed prediction in a network.
The problem of anomaly detection of traffic sensors is reviewed in [87]. The paper categorizes
different methods into the three levels of macroscopic, mesoscopic, and microscopic, and provides
practical guidelines for anomaly detection. The work in [146] presents three methods to detect
faulty traffic measurements. The methods are based on Pearson’s correlation, cross-correlation, and
multivariate ARIMA. Finally, the work in [117] presents a test, which is based on the relationship
between flows at adjacent sensors to detect faulty loop detectors. Nevertheless, since previous papers
use static thresholds, their methods result in high losses due to FPs and FNs.
The problem of optimal parameter selection for anomaly detection is studied in [74]. The paper
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shows that computing optimal attacks and defenses is computationally expensive, and proposes
heuristic algorithms for computing near-optimal strategies. More details about this work can be
found in Chapter 2. Also, we discussed the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly-based
detectors implemented in dynamical systems in the face of strategic attacks in the previous chapter.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Route Planning
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with a set V of vertices and a set E of arcs. Each arc (u, v) ∈ E
has an associated nonnegative cost c(u, v). The cost (i.e., length) of a path is the sum of the costs
of its arcs. In the point-to-point shortest path problem, one is given as input the graph G, a query
q = (o, d), where o ∈ V is an origin and d ∈ V is a destination, and the objective is to find a
minimum-cost (i.e., shortest) path from o to d in G. In the many-to-many shortest path problem, a
set of queries Q is given, and the goal is to find the minimum-cost path for each query q = (o, d) ∈ Q.
There exist many route planning algorithms that compute optimal solutions in an efficient manner
[12]. Among these methods, the bidirectional Dijkstra’s algorithm with binary heaps computes point-
to-point shortest path in O(|E|+ |V | log |V |). Further, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm solves all pairs
shortest paths in O(|V |3). A large number of methods have been designed to improve running time of
shortest-path algorithms. For example, contraction hierarchies and arc flags have been successfully
used [36].
4.3.2 Gaussian Process Regression
GPs provide a Bayesian paradigm to learn an implicit functional relationship y = f(x) from a
training dataset {(xi, yi); i = 1, 2, ..., n}, where xi ∈ Rd represents the vector of observed input
variables (i.e., predictors), and yi is the observed target value. A comprehensive discussion of GPs
in machine learning can be found in [115].
GPs directly elicit a prior distribution on the function f(x), and assume it to be a GP a priori,
f(x) ∼ GP (µ(x), k(x,x′)) . (4.1)
For a new point x∗, the goal is to predict y∗ = f(x∗). Given that the regression function is a GP, the
distribution of the values of f at any finite number of points is a multivariate Gaussian distribution.
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Therefore, y
y∗
 ∼ N(µ(x),
K K ′∗
K∗ K∗∗
), (4.2)
where K is the covariance matrix for the labeled points, K∗ is the covariance vector between the
new point and the labeled points, and K∗∗ is the measurement noise. Then,
Pr(y∗ |y) ∼ N
(
K∗K−1y,K∗∗ −K∗K−1K ′∗
)
. (4.3)
The prediction of a GP model depends on the choice of covariance function, which identifies
the expected correlation between the observed data. Typically, a parametric family of functions is
used, and the hyperparameters are inferred from the data. Examples of the commonly used co-
variance functions include polynomial kernel, automatic relevance determination (ARD), and radial
basis function (RBF). Methods for learning the hyperparameters are based on maximization of the
marginal likelihood, which can be performed using gradient-based optimization algorithms.
4.4 System Model
In this section, we present the system model. We first define a model of transportation network.
Then, we construct a detector for identifying faulty traffic sensors using a prediction model based
on Gaussian Processes.
4.4.1 Transportation Network
Consider a transportation network modeled as a graph G = (V,E), where edges represent road
segments and vertices represent connections between road segments (e.g., traffic junctions). We
assume that a subset S ⊆ E of the road segments are monitored by sensors that measure traffic
state (e.g., speed, occupancy, flow) at discrete timesteps k ∈ N. The measurements of these sensors
are transmitted to a navigation service, which given a set of queries Q(k) at timestep k, computes
the corresponding shortest paths. For segments without a traffic sensor, we assume the navigation
service uses either previously computed values or predicted values using measurements of adjacent
sensors.
Traffic sensors may be faulty due to miscalibration or hardware failure. If a sensor s ∈ S is
faulty, there is a discrepancy between the actual and measured values. In other words, if as(k) is
the actual value and ms(k) is the measured value of faulty sensor s, then ms(k) = as(k) + εs(k),
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where εs(k) is the fault value at time k. In this model, we do not consider faults that result in no
data being sent, since such cases can easily be filtered out by an operator.
4.4.2 Gaussian Process-Based Detector
Given the sensor measurements, we need to decide whether some sensors are faulty. We assume
that the number of sensors that simultaneously become faulty is low, which is true in practice. As
a result, for any sensor, the majority of nearby sensors that have not been marked faulty provide
reliable traffic data, and so we can use these nearby sensors to predict the value measured by the
sensor in question. To detect faults, we then compare the predictions to the measurements, and
if there is a significant difference between the predicted values and the received measurements, an
alarm indicating presence of a fault in that particular sensor is triggered.
4.4.2.1 Traffic Prediction
As our traffic predictor, we use GPs, which is a kernel-based machine learning method. Kernel-
based methods have gained special attention for traffic prediction because of their generalization
capability and superior nonlinear approximation. Among different kernel-based methods, previous
work shows that GPs outperform other methods such as ARIMA and neural networks [141]. We use
GPs because in addition to the above advantages, it allows for explicit probabilistic interpretation
of forecasting outputs.
As the kernel function, we decide for the commonly used ARD squared exponential,
K(m(k),m(k)′) = σ2f exp
(
−1
2
d∑
i=1
(mi(k)−m′i(k))2
σ2i
)
, (4.4)
where m(k) and m(k)′ are vectors of measurements, and σf and {σi}di=1 are hyperparameters.
We let the target variable be the predicted traffic value ps (e.g., traffic flow or occupancy) of
sensor s ∈ S at timestep k. Further, we let the predictor variables be the measured traffic values
of other sensors at the same timestep. In practice, two sensors are highly correlated if they are in
close proximity. Therefore, it is possible to select predictor variables as the measured values of d
closest sensors from the target sensor, where the choice of d depends on the network structure. This
way, the predicted traffic value is defined as ps(k) = f(mV (s)(k)), where V (s) is the set of d closest
sensors from s.
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4.4.2.2 Detection Algorithm
We can efficiently detect failures for each sensor s ∈ S, by comparing the measured traffic value
ms(k) with the predicted traffic value ps(k). We use Cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) as the
detection algorithm, which is a sequential analysis technique typically used for monitoring change
detection [105].
Consider sensor s ∈ S, with a sequence of measurements ms(1), ...,ms(k) and corresponding traf-
fic predictions with means ps(1), ..., ps(k) and standard deviations σs(1), ..., σs(k). The standardized
residual signal is defined as
zs(k) =
ms(k)− ps(k)
σs(k)
. (4.5)
Moreover, upper and lower cumulative sums are defined as,
Us(k) = max(0, Us(k − 1) + zs(k)− bs), (4.6)
Ls(k) = min(0, Ls(k − 1) + zs(k) + bs), (4.7)
where Us(k) = Ls(k) = 0 for k = 1, and bs is a small constant.
Denoting the detection threshold at timestep k by ηs(k), a measurement sequence violates the
CUSUM criterion at the sample zs(k) if it obeys Us(k) > ηs(k) or Ls(k) < −ηs(k). Formally, letting
H0 and H1 be the null and fault hypothesis, the decision rule is described by
ds(Us(k), Ls(k)) =
 H1 if Us(k) > ηs(k) or Ls(k) < −ηs(k)H0 otherwise . (4.8)
4.4.2.3 False-Negative and False-Positive Trade-off
In anomaly detectors, there might be a false negative, which means failing to raise an alarm when
a fault did happen. Further, there might be a false positive, which means raising an alarm when
the sensor exhibits normal behavior. It is desirable to reduce the FP and FN probabilities as much
as possible. But, there exists a trade-off between them, which can be controlled by changing the
threshold. In particular, by decreasing (increasing) the threshold, one can decrease (increase) the
FN probability and increase (decrease) the FP probability.
We represent the FN probability for each sensor s by the function FNs : R+ → [0, 1], where
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FNs(ηs(k)) is the probability of FN when the threshold is ηs(k), given that the sensor is faulty.
Similarly, we denote the attainable FP probability for each sensor s by FPs : R+ → [0, 1], where
FPs(ηs(k)) is the FP probability when the threshold is ηs(k), given that the sensor is in normal
operation. It is possible to plot the FP probability as a function of the FN probability for various
threshold values [43] (e.g., see Figure 4.3).
4.5 Optimal Detection
In this section, we formulate the problem of finding optimal thresholds for anomaly detection of
traffic sensors, considering route planning as their primary application. The objective is to select
the optimal thresholds for anomaly detectors in order to minimize the losses caused by false positives
and false negatives. Then, we present an algorithm to find near-optimal detection thresholds. Finally,
we characterize critical sensors, whose failure can have high impact on the traffic application.
4.5.1 Optimization Problem
First, consider the set of queries Q, and a route planning algorithm that takes as inputs the set of
queries and the measured and predicted traffic values, and outputs the optimal routes. For a single
query q ∈ Q and sensor s ∈ S, we denote by Pq (ms) the optimal route computed using the measured
traffic values for all sensors, and we denote by Pq (ps) the optimal route using the predicted value
ps for sensor s and the measured values m−s for all other sensors. Finally, for a given route r and
sensor s, let T (r,ms) and T (r, ps) be the total travel time based on the measured ms and predicted
ps values for sensor s, respectively, and the measured values m−s for all other sensors.
Then, T (Pq (ps),ms) is the measured travel time of the shortest route computed using the
predicted value ps for sensor s. Similarly, T (Pq (ms),ms) is the measured travel time of the shortest
route computed using the measured value ms. We define the loss caused by a false positive as
follows:
CFPs,q (ps,ms) = T (Pq (ps),ms)− T (Pq (ms),ms) , (4.9)
that is, the difference in measured travel time between using either the predicted or the measured
value for sensor s.
The rationale behind the above expression is the following. In case of a FP, according to the
detector, the measured value ms is incorrect, but it is actually correct. Consequently, we choose
a route that is computed using our prediction ps instead of the optimal route, which would be
computed using the measurement ms. To quantify the loss, we need to compare the travel times of
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the two routes, and we must use the measured traffic value ms for this comparison since that is the
correct value in this case.
Similarly, for a FN, T (Pq (ms), ps) is the predicted travel time of the shortest route using mea-
sured value ms, and T (Pq (ps), ps) is the predicted travel time of the shortest path using predicted
value ps. The loss caused by a FN is
CFNs,q (ps,ms) = T (Pq (ms), ps)− T (Pq (ps), ps) , (4.10)
that is, the difference in predicted travel time between using either the measured or the predicted
value for sensor s. Note that in (4.9) and (4.10), the values of P and T can be computed using
existing route planning algorithms [12].
Next, let FPs(ηs(k)) and FNs(ηs(k)) be the probabilities of false-positive and false-negative
errors when detection threshold ηs(k) is selected. Further, let pf be the probability of fault, and let
pn = 1 − pf be the probability of normal operation. For a given query q, the total loss caused by
FPs and FNs is,
Ls,q(ηs(k)) =FPs(ηs(k)) · CFPs,q (ps,ms) · pn + FNs(ηs(k)) · CFNs,q (ps,ms) · pf . (4.11)
Considering the set of all queries Q, the total loss is
Ls(ηs(k), Q) =
∑
q∈Q
Ls,q(ηs(k)), (4.12)
which allows us to define the notion of optimal detection threshold for a sensor.
Definition 1 (Optimal Detection). The detection threshold η∗s (k) is optimal for sensor s if it min-
imizes the loss function (4.12). Formally, η∗s (k) is optimal for sensor s if
η∗s (k) ∈ argmin
ηs(k)
Ls(ηs(k), Q). (4.13)
Figure 4.1 shows the flow of information in our approach. At each timestep k, given measurements
m(k), the predictor computes the predicted measurements p(k). Then, given a set of queries Q(k),
and the predictions and measurements, the thresholds η(k) are computed for the detectors using
the algorithm presented next.
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Figure 4.1: Information flow in our approach.
4.5.2 Algorithm for Obtaining Thresholds
We present Algorithm 4.1 to find near-optimal detection thresholds. The algorithm implements a
random-restart hill climbing technique. If the FP to FN trade-off curve is convex, which makes (4.12)
convex, we are able to compute optimal thresholds using convex optimization methods. However,
this is not generally the case, as trade-off curves tend to be non-convex (see Figure 4.3 for an instance
of a trade-off curve).
The algorithm considers each sensor separately, and finds its corresponding detection thresh-
old. At each iteration, the algorithm selects a new starting point and finds a local minimum using
gradient-based optimization. In order to avoid unnecessary computation, we skip computing detec-
tion thresholds for sensors with very similar measured and predicted traffic values. Formally, for
sensor s ∈ E, we select detection threshold ηs = ∞, if |zs(k)| < b. This is because the detector’s
statistics Us(k) and Ls(k) are decreasing and it is unlikely that an alert would be raised if one was
not raised before.
4.5.3 Critical Sensors
Value of the optimal loss gives insight on the criticality of traffic sensors. Fault on a sensor that has
high loss value degrades the system’s performance more than fault on a sensor with low loss value.
We formally define the set of δ-critical sensors below.
Definition 2 (Critical Sensors). Set of δ-critical sensors in a time period [1, T ] is defined as the set
of sensors which have the average optimal loss values of greater than or equal to δ. That is to say,
a sensor s is critical if 1T
∑T
k=1 Ls(η
∗
s (k), Q(k)) ≥ δ.
Identifying critical sensors is beneficial, since it allows us to locate the most vulnerable elements of
a network, which should be strengthened first to increase the robustness of a network. For example,
if we have a limited budget which permits us to replace only a subset of the sensors with more robust
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Algorithm 4.1 Algorithm for Obtaining Thresholds
1: Input Q, FP (η), FN(η), α, γ
2: Initialize: η ← η0, L∗ ←∞
3: for all s ∈ S do
4: if |z(k)| ≤ b then
5: η∗s ←∞
6: else
7: while i < N do
8: ηs,new ←↩ FP−1s (Uniform([0, 1]))
9: ηs,old ← 0
10: while |Ls(ηs,new, Q)− Ls(ηs,old, Q)|>α do
11: ηs,old ← ηs,new
12: ηs,new ← ηs,old − γ∇ηsLs(ηs,old, Q)
13: end while
14: if Ls(Q, ηs,new) < L
∗
s then
15: η∗s ← ηs,new
16: L∗s ← Ls(ηs,new, Q)
17: end if
18: i← i+ 1
19: end while
20: end if
21: end for
22: return η∗
ones, then we should start with the critical sensors.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we implement our method and evaluate it numerically using a route planning plat-
form.
4.6.1 System Model
4.6.1.1 Traffic Data
We use a traffic dataset obtained from the Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS)
database [24]. The database provides real-time and historical traffic data from over 39,000 indi-
vidual sensors, which span the freeway system across metropolitan areas of the State of California.
Figure 5.5 shows the location of sensors in our case study, in which a total of 40 sensors are con-
sidered. We use the 5-minute aggregated data collected on the weekdays of September 3, 2016 to
September 17, 2016. The dataset contains 115,200 data points. The first 7 days are used as training
data, and the remaining 7 days are used as test data.
To simulate faults, we use models for a specific set of fault types and ranges of fault magnitudes,
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Figure 4.2: A map of traffic sensors installed in Downtown Los Angeles.
which is similar to the approach presented in [139]. The fault models are: 1) Constant Relative
Overcount (caused by e.g., unsuitable sensitivity levels); range: 3% to 7% of the actual values
(i.e., εs(k) = usas(k) where 0.03 ≤ us ≤ 0.07), 2) Conditional Undercount (caused by e.g., sensor
saturation); range: 7% to 13% (i.e., εs(k) = usas(k) where −0.13 ≤ us ≤ −0.07).
Next, for each sensor, we construct a predictor using the measurements of its d closest sensors
as the predictor variables. We select d = 10 since it results in the minimum overall prediction error.
We choose bs = 0.05 for all the detectors, to make them sensitive to small shifts in the mean. We
evaluate each detector’s performance by plotting the FP probability against the FN probability at
various threshold values. Figure 4.3 shows the trade-off curve of the detector implemented for a
sensor, whose identifier in the PeMS dataset is VDS 774685.
4.6.1.2 Route Planner
We use OpenTripPlanner (OTP), which is an open source platform for multi-modal route planning
[93]. OTP relies on open data standards including OpenStreetMap for street networks. The default
routing algorithm in OTP is the A∗ algorithm with a cost-heuristic to prune the search. For improved
performance on large networks, it also uses contraction hierarchies.
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Figure 4.3: Trade-off between the false-positive and false-negative probabilities.
4.6.2 Results
We simulate a route planning scenario in OTP, where the edge costs (i.e., travel times) are updated
using our traffic data. For a source and destination as shown in Figure 4.4a, we consider 1000
queries made on September 15, from 9:00 am to 10:00 am. Figure 4.4a shows the shortest route
when a particular sensor (i.e., VDS 774685) is healthy, and Figure 4.4b shows the shortest route
when the same sensor has a conditional undercount fault. Note that if the fault remains undetected
(i.e., false negative), a suboptimal route (Figure 4.4b) will be selected instead of the optimal route
(Figure 4.4a). In another scenario, assume an alarm is triggered under normal operation (i.e., false
positive). This means that the predicted value is used for route planning instead of the accurate
measurement value, which depending on the prediction accuracy, may result in a suboptimal route
planning solution.
We use Algorithm 4.1 to find optimal thresholds that minimize losses due to FPs and FNs. We
assume that for each sensor, the probability of fault is pf = 0.05. For the previously considered
sensor, at k = 1 (i.e., from 9:00 am to 9:05 am), the loss value (4.12) as a function of the threshold
is shown in Figure 4.5. In this case, Algorithm 4.1 finds the optimal thresholds. For the Conditional
Undercount, the optimal threshold and the minimum loss are η = 0.17 and L = 16.2, whereas for
the Constant Relative Overcount, the optimal threshold and the minimum loss are η = 0.39 and
L = 30.0.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.4: Reroute occurs due to a conditional undercount fault false negative. (a) Normal. (b)
Fault. (Green flag is the source and red flag is the destination.)
Further, Table 4.1 shows the average optimal loss for some sensors, i.e., 1T
∑T
k=1 Ls(η
∗
s (k), Q(k)).
As a baseline, we also compute the minimum loss when the thresholds have static values at all the
timesteps. That is, for all k, we assign ηs(k) = η
∗
s , where η
∗
s ∈ argminηs
∑
k Ls(ηs, Q). We observe
that our method achieves significantly smaller losses compared the static case. The loss values can
also be used to identify the set of δ-critical sensors. For example, 50.0-critical sensors are made bold
in the table.
4.7 Conclusions
We studied the problem of finding optimal detection parameters for anomaly detection of traffic
sensors, considering route planning as application. We constructed a predictor using Gaussian pro-
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Figure 4.5: Loss as a function of detection threshold.
Table 4.1: Average Optimal Losses
Sensor ID
Cond. Undercount Cons. Rel. Overcount
Optimal Static Optimal Static
774685 16.2 31.2 30.0 38.1
774672 18.0 27.6 22.1 36.7
772501 15.6 24.3 12.8 19.2
763453 51.8 74.3 57.5 80.9
737158 43.0 59.6 54.8 71.4
cesses, which was then used for anomaly detection. We studied how to find the optimal detection
parameters, which minimize losses due to FP and FN errors. We also characterized critical sen-
sors, whose failure can have high impact on the traffic application. We implemented our method
and evaluated it numerically using a route-planning platform. Our evaluations indicated that the
proposed detection method successfully minimizes the performance losses.
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Chapter 5
Application-Aware Anomaly Detection of Sensor Measurements in Cyber-Physical Systems
Detection errors, i.e., false alarms and missed detections, are inevitable in anomaly detection systems.
Such errors can cause highly degraded performance in CPS applications, as false alarms result in
recovery that is not needed, and missed detections result in failing to perform recovery. In this
chapter, we present a framework for application-aware anomaly detection, that is, an anomaly
detector that configures itself such that the application performance in the presence of detection
errors is as close as possible to the performance that could have been obtained if there were no
detection errors. We evaluate our result using a case study of real-time control of traffic signals, and
show that our application-aware detector significantly outperforms several baseline detectors.
5.1 Introduction
Sensors deployed in CPS applications for monitoring and control purposes are prone to anomalies
(e.g., failures and cyber-attacks). To detect anomalies and prevent their harmful effects, anomaly
detection systems (ADS) are implemented. However, ADS suffer from false positives (i.e., false
alarms) and false negatives (i.e., missed detections), which may result in high performance degra-
dation in CPS applications. In particular, false positives result in recovery that is not required, and
false negatives result in failing to perform recovery when it is indeed required. Such detection errors
can cause incorrect measurements being transmitted to the controller, and thus result in obtaining
non-optimal or even destabilizing control decisions, which may compromise the performance of the
system. For example, detection errors may result in disastrous events such as reactor explosion in
process control systems, water contamination in water distribution networks, and extremely heavy
traffic congestion in intelligent transportation systems [132, 76].
To address this, it is necessary to take into account the CPS application when designing anomaly
detectors, and to quantify the losses in the application caused by potential detection errors. In order
to minimize the losses, while it is desirable to reduce the detection errors as much as possible, there
exists a trade-off between them, which can be changed through a detection threshold. Therefore,
by selecting the right detection threshold, the performance losses caused by detection errors can be
minimized.
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Our goal is to perform these steps using a novel approach which takes into account the behavior
of the controller in the configuration of the anomaly detector. We call the framework Application-
Aware Detection. In such framework, the detector is aware of the interactions between the controller
and the application, and so it can compute how each detection decision can affect the underlying
application. Knowing this, the detector attempts to make detection decisions that will result in the
least performance loss in the underlying application if the detection decision is not accurate due to
false positives and false negatives.
Previous works have proposed different anomaly detection methods for CPS [132]. In addition,
there is a wide body of literature on machine learning-based anomaly detection [29]. However, there
is little work that takes into account the tight interaction between the detector and the controller
of a CPS, which as we show in this work, if taken into account, can result in improved performance
and robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such approach is used for
improved detection performance in CPS.
In this chapter, we propose the application-aware anomaly detection framework for detecting
anomalies in sensors measurements in CPS. First, we devise an effective detector for identifying
anomalies in sensor measurements using machine learning regression. Second, we propose an ap-
proach to recover from anomalies in order to maintain operation when detection alerts are triggered.
Then, we formulate the problem of application-aware detection, in which the anomaly detector is
optimally configured such that the performance loss in the presence of detection errors is minimized.
In particular, the thresholds are selected such that the performance of the system in the presence of
detection errors is as close as possible to the performance that could have been obtained if there were
no detection errors. We show that the application-aware detection problem is computationally chal-
lenging, and then we present an efficient algorithm to find near-optimal solutions. We also study two
special variations of the application-aware detection problem, that is, single detector and detectors
with equal threshold. We optimally solve both special cases, which aside from practical advantages,
can provide insights into the novelty of the approach. We then perform simulation experiments on
a case study of real-time control of traffic signals. We evaluate our approach numerically and show
its benefits in comparison to standard anomaly detection practices. Finally, we offer concluding
remarks and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the application-aware detector, and how
it can become suitable for real-world deployment.
We believe this framework can be useful in systems where there is a significant number of sensors
with high variations in sensor values, which can potentially cause many false positives and false
negatives. A real-world example of such CPS application would be real-time control of traffic signals,
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Figure 5.1: System Model. Note that in this case w = m.
as in large cities, there are thousands of sensors that could become anomalous.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce the system model
and present the problems that are studied in this paper. In Section 5.3, we discuss the regression-
based anomaly detection framework. In Section 5.4, we present the application-aware detection
problem for detection error-tolerant selection of thresholds in anomaly detectors. In Section 5.5, we
analyze the application-aware detection problem and present an algorithm to obtain near-optimal
solutions. In Section 5.6, we study two special variations of the application-aware detection problem,
that is, single detector and detectors with equal threshold. In Section 5.7, we evaluate our approach
numerically using a case study of real-time control of traffic signals. Finally, we offer concluding
remarks in Section 5.8.
5.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we present the system model. We also present a running example of real-time control
of traffic signals that is used throughout the chapter to demonstrate the approach.
Notation
Vectors are denoted by bold symbols. Vector y at timestep k is described by yk. We omit the
timestep symbol when all symbols have same timestep k. However, timestep symbol is used when
there are different timesteps present or when it eases understanding. Given vector y and set of
indices I, vector yI is defined as a vector with same size as y that has the same size as y for indices
in I, and is zero otherwise. Given two vectors x and y, the union operator computes the sum of
them, that is, x ∪ y = x+ y. For a list of symbols used in this chapter, see Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
S Set of sensors
as actual value for sensor s
ms Measured value for sensor s
ps Predicted value for sensor s
TPs(τ) True positive probability of the detector for sensor s given detection threshold τ
FPs(τ) False positive probability of the detector for sensor s given detection threshold τ
TNs(τ) True negative probability of the detector for sensor s given detection threshold τ
FNs(τ) False negative probability of the detector for sensor s given detection threshold τ
ws Recovered measurement transmitted to the controller for sensor s
rs Residual signal for sensor s
5.2.1 System Model
Consider a CPS, e.g., intelligent transportation system and process control system, that provides
some service or utility. At each timestep, given transmitted measurements w containing information
about the system, the controller computes a control input u that maximizes the utility function
J(w, u)1. In other words, the controller finds the optimal control input u∗ defined as
u∗ ∈ argmax
u
J(w, u) , (5.1)
where the optimal utility is denoted by J∗(w).
Anomalous Sensors. Sensors may be anomalous due to hardware failures or sensor attacks. If
sensor s ∈ S is anomalous, there is a discrepancy between the actual and observed measured values.
In other words, if as is the actual value and ms is the observed measurement at a timestep, for an
anomalous sensor we have ms = as+es, where es ∈ R is the error value at that timestep. Figure 5.1
illustrates this idea.
5.2.2 Anomaly Detection, Recovery, and Resilience
Anomalies may incur extensive damage to the system and degrade the performance significantly.
Our first problem is to construct an anomaly detection method in order to detect anomalies in sensor
measurements.
1For a minimization problem minu J ′(w, u), we can simply use J(w, u) = −J ′(w, u).
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Problem 1 (Anomaly Detection). Construct an anomaly detection method in order to detect anoma-
lies in sensor measurements.
Suppose we have constructed such anomaly detection method. Upon detection, the system must
recover from anomalies and continue operation. Therefore, our second problem is to design a recovery
method to accommodate this.
Problem 2 (Recovery). Design a recovery approach in order to continue operation in the presence
of detection alerts.
Suppose we have designed such recovery approach that computes the recovered vector of mea-
surements in the presence of detection alerts. In anomaly detectors, there are detection errors, that
is, false positives (i.e., false alarms) and false negatives (i.e., missed detections). If there are no
detection errors, the recovered vector of measurements would be close to the actual values (of course
assuming that the recovery approach works well). However, in the presence of detection errors,
false positives result in recovery that is not required, and false negatives result in failing to perform
recovery when it is indeed needed.
To see the effect of detection errors on the application, let w′ denote the recovered measurement
vector, which will result in the utility J ′ = maxu J(w′, u). However, if there were no detection
error, we could have obtained the optimal utility J∗ = maxu(a, u). Our final problem, which is
the problem of resilience and the main contribution of this chapter, is to optimally configure our
anomaly detectors through selection of detection thresholds so that the actual obtained utility in
the presence of detection errors (i.e., J ′) is as close as possible to the utility that would have been
obtained if there were no detection errors (i.e., J∗).
Problem 3 (Resilience). Find detection thresholds such that the obtained utility in the presence of
detection errors is as close as possible to the utility that would have been obtained if there were no
detection errors.
We call the detector that solves the above problem the Application-Aware Detector.
5.2.3 Example: Real-Time Control of Traffic Signals
We present a running example of real-time control of traffic signals that is used throughout the
chapter. In what follows, we describe the widely-popular max-pressure controller for optimal control
of traffic signals with minor modifications in assumptions. In the original max-pressure algorithm
presented in [135], traffic state is represented using exogenous demands that are then routed through
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the network using routing ratios. In this work, instead of using exogenous demands that are then
transformed to internal demands through using routing ratios, we assume that the internal demands
are directly provided. Note that this does not affect the max-pressure algorithm as the algorithm
effectively uses internal demands in its computations.
Max-Pressure Controller. Consider a network of intersections I with road links L. Movement
from a link i ∈ L to a link j ∈ L is denoted by a pair (i, j) ∈ E. Further, let each movement (i, j)
have a queue associated with it, and at each timestep, let x(i, j) represent the length of this queue.
The length of the queue shows how many vehicles intend to travel from i to j. For each movement
(i, j), the pressure is defined as
P (i, j) = x(i, j)−
∑
p
x(j, p) ,
which is simply the number of cars in the queue minus the total number of cars in the downstream
queues.
Each intersection n has a traffic signal with a set of admissible stages Φn. Each stage un ∈ Φn is
a set of simultaneous movements that are permitted by the traffic signal. If un permits a movement
(i, j), then un(i, j) = 1, otherwise un(i, j) = 0. Let c(i, j) be the saturation flow of movement (i, j).
Given a stage un ∈ Φn, pressure-release (i.e., utility) for intersection n is defined as
Jn(un) =
∑
i,j
c(i, j)P (i, j)un(i, j) .
Algorithm 5.1 presents the max-pressure (MP) controller in detail. At each intersection n, the
MP controller selects the stage un that results in the maximum pressure-release. In other words,
the MP controller computes
u∗n ∈ argmax
un∈Φn
∑
i,j
c(i, j)P (i, j)un(i, j) . (5.2)
Note that at each intersection, the MP control selects a stage that depends only on the queues
adjacent to the intersection. It is shown that the MP controller maximizes network throughput [135].
The overall utility for traffic network can be calculated by adding individual utilities for the inter-
sections. That is, J(x, u) =
∑
n Jn(x, un) where u = {un}n∈I . Note that using this representation,
the MP optimization problem becomes the same as (5.1).
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Algorithm 5.1 Max-Pressure Controller [135]
Input: x(i, j) for all (i, j) ∈ E
1: for all n ∈ I do
2: for all (i, j) ∈ E do
3: P (i, j)← x(i, j)−∑p x(j, p)
4: end for
5: u∗n ← argmaxun∈Φn
∑
i,j c(i, j)P (i, j)un(i, j)
6: end for
7: return {u∗n}n∈I
5.3 Anomaly Detection
In this section, we construct a regression-based anomaly detector for identifying anomalous sensor
measurements. We then discuss detection errors and some metrics that are used to characterize
them.
5.3.1 Regression-Based Anomaly Detector
To protect the system against anomalies, we must detect them quickly and accurately. Many dif-
ferent anomaly detection systems have been proposed in the literature. For a comprehensive review
of anomaly detection methods, we refer the reader to [29] for machine-learning based detectors
and [132] for detectors used in CPS. In this work, we use regression-based anomaly detectors be-
cause in addition to state-of-the-art detection performance, such detectors require no knowledge of
the physical system, can take into account complex and nonlinear behaviors of the system, and are
easy to implement and can be highly scalable.
Architecture. Figure 5.2 shows the architecture of regression-based anomaly detector. The
detector consists of two main components: 1) Predictor and 2) Statistical Test. The predictor
predicts the value of a sensor given some information about the system state (e.g., current value of
other sensors, previous control inputs). Then, the statistical test compares the computed prediction
to the observed measurement and decides whether the sensor is normal or anomalous. We describe
each component in more detail considering our running example.
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ps = f
(s)(mA(s))
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−
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Figure 5.2: Regression-Based Anomaly Detector
5.3.1.1 Predictor
Our goal is to find a function f (s) that maps spatial or temporal features to the actual value of a
sensor s (e.g., traffic flow or occupancy). In practice, two traffic sensors are highly correlated if they
are in close proximity. Thus, we let the features be the measured values of other adjacent sensors
at the same timestep, denoted by mA(s) where A(s) is a set of sensors adjacent to A(s) found using
cross-validation. Note that this approach is particularly applicable to traffic networks as there
are usually many redundant sensors in the network. The function f (s) can then be obtained using
suitable machine learning regression algorithm such as deep neural networks [89], Gaussian Processes
[47], and many others [96]. Thus, for sensor s, we obtain the prediction as ps = f
(s)(mA(s)).
5.3.1.2 Statistical Test
The statistical test efficiently detects anomalies for each sensor s ∈ S by comparing the measured
value ms(k) with the predicted value ps(k). Given a set of measured values m = 〈ms〉s∈S and
predicted values p = 〈ps〉s∈S , residual signals are computed as r = |m − p|. Then, given the
residuals, the statistical test makes detection decisions d = 〈ds〉s∈S , where for each sensor s, the
decision ds is either normal or anomalous.
Different detection algorithms can be used to implement the statistical test [11]. In this work,
we consider a stateless threshold-based detector defined as follows. Given detection thresholds
τ = 〈τs〉s∈S , for each sensor s, if the residual rs is less than or equal to the threshold τs, then s is
marked normal and otherwise, s is marked anomalous. Thus
ds =

normal (s ∈ N) if rs ≤ τs
anomalous (s ∈ A) otherwise
. (5.3)
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5.3.2 Detection Error
In anomaly detectors, there might be a false negative, which means failing to raise an alarm when an
anomaly did happen. Further, there might be a false positive, which means raising an alarm when
the system exhibits normal behavior. It is desirable to reduce the false positive and false negative
probabilities as much as possible. But, there exists a trade-off between them, which can be controlled
by changing the detection threshold. In particular, by decreasing (increasing) the threshold, one can
decrease (increase) the FN probability and increase (decrease) the FP probability.
We represent the FN probability for each sensor s by the function FNs : R+ → [0, 1], where
FNs(τs) is the probability of FN when the threshold is τs, given that the sensor is anomalous.
Similarly, we denote the attainable FP probability for each sensor s by FPs : R+ → [0, 1], where
FPs(τs) is the FP probability when the threshold is τs, given that the sensor is in normal operation.
The true positive and true negative probabilities are also denoted by TPs(τs) and TNs(τs). Clearly,
we have TPs(τs) = 1− FNs(τs) and TNs(τs) = 1− FPs(τs).
5.4 Application-Aware Anomaly Detection
In this section, we present the problem of application-aware anomaly detection. First, we describe
an approach for recovery in order to continue operation in the presence of detection alerts. Then,
we quantify the utility losses in the application caused by potential detection errors. Followed by
this, we formulate the problem of application-aware anomaly detection, i.e., the problem of finding
detection thresholds so that the obtained utility in the presence of detection errors is as close as
possible to the utility that could have been obtained if there were no detection errors.
Architecture. Figure 5.3 shows the architecture of the application-aware anomaly detection
framework. If there is a detection alert, the prediction is routed to the application, instead of the
measurement. The threshold of each detector is selected such that in the presence of detection
error, the routed value (i.e., measurement or prediction) still obtains a utility close to the utility
that could have been obtained if there were no detectors. (Note that in the figure, the predictor
is not connected to the anomaly detector since this framework is applicable to any threshold-based
detector, and not only regression-based detectors.)
5.4.1 Recovery
We present a recovery approach in order to continue operation in the presence of detection alerts.
If sensor s is marked normal, then the observed measurement ms is transmitted to the controller.
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Figure 5.3: Architecture of Application-Aware Anomaly Detection.
However, if sensor s is marked anomalous, then the observed measurement is discarded and instead,
the prediction ps is transmitted to the controller. The switch in Figure 5.3 illustrates the idea.
To formally represent this, let ws denote the recovered measurement transmitted to the controller.
Then, ws can be described as
ws =

ms if s is normal
ps if s is anomalous
.
For our threshold-based detector defined by (5.3), the measurement of sensor s is marked normal
if |ps − ms| ≤ τs and anomalous otherwise. Therefore, for threshold-based detectors, the above
equation can be re-written as
ws(τs) =

ms if |ms − ps| ≤ τs
ps otherwise
. (5.4)
Note that in this case, given prediction ps and measurement ms, the value of ws depends on the
threshold τs. From now on, when we want to highlight this dependence, we use the notation ws(τs)
instead of ws. To summarize, given vectors of predictions p, measurements m, and thresholds τ ,
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using (5.4), we are able to compute the recovered measurement vector w(τ ) that is transmitted to
the controller.
Note that using this approach, we assume that when a measurement is normal, it provides the
best obtainable value for the sensor. Also, we assume that when a measurement is anomalous,
the prediction provides the best obtainable value for the sensor. Handling uncertainties in sensor
measurements and errors in predictions are beyond the scope of this chapter.
5.4.2 Worst-Case Utility Loss Due to Detection Error
The control input u (i.e., defined by (5.1)) depends on the recovered measurements w(τ ) (i.e.,
defined by (5.4)), and the recovered measurements w(τ ) depend on the detection thresholds τ .
Therefore, the value of control input depends on thresholds τ . For example, if the thresholds are
small (large), there will be many (few) detection alarms, and so predictions (measurements) will
often be transmitted to the controller. Unfortunately, this will be problematic in the presence of
detection errors.
Given threshold τ , let N be the set of sensors that are marked normal (i.e., ∀s ∈ N, rs ≤
τs) and let A be the set of sensors that are marked anomalous (i.e., ∀s ∈ A, rs > τs). Based
on the recovery method (5.4), the predictions are used for marked-anomalous sensors in A and
measurements are used for marked-normal sensors in N to create the recovered measurement vector,
i.e., w = pA ∪mN . Next, given the recovered measurements pA ∪mN , the controller computes the
control input u0 ∈ argmaxu J(pA ∪ mN , u), concisely denoted by U(pA ∪mN ). This is expected
to obtain the utility J(pA ∪mN , u0). However, the expected utility is obtained only if there is no
detection error. Unfortunately, if there is a detection error, a different and potentially much lower
utility is obtained.
Obtained Utility vs. Optimal Utility. We now quantify the actual obtained utility in
presence of detection errors. Let fp ⊆ A be the set of false positives, that is, sensors in fp are
normal but they are marked anomalous. Since these sensors are normal, the measurements mfp
should have been transmitted to the controller, but due to false positives, the predictions were
mistakenly transmitted. Similarly, let fn ⊆ N be the set of false negatives, that is, sensors in fn
are anomalous but they are marked normal. Since these sensors are anomalous, the predictions pfn
should have been transmitted to the controller but the measurements were mistakenly transmitted.
Hence, for the control input u0 = U(pA ∪mN ) computed above, the obtained utility will actually
be J(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪pfn, u0). On the other hand, if there were not detection errors, the optimal
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control input would have been u∗ ∈ argmaxu J(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn, u), concisely denoted by
U(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn).
Utility Loss. To put this all together, given decisions A and N (computed given r and τ
as (5.3)), and the detection performance sets tp, fp, tn, and fn, the probability of occurrence of
such detection error scenario is
Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) =
∏
s∈tp
TPs(τs) ·
∏
s∈fp
FPs(τs) ·
∏
s∈tn
TNs(τs) ·
∏
s∈fn
FNs(τs) . (5.5)
As discussed above, in this case, we could have obtained the optimal utility J(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪
pfn, U(ptp∪mfp∪mtn∪pfn)), but we obtained the smaller utility J(ptp∪mfp∪mtn∪pfn, U(pA∪
mN )). Thus, we incurred a utility loss of
∆J = J∗(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Optimal Utility
− J(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn, U(pA ∪mN ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Obtained Utility
. (5.6)
Hence, the expected utility loss of detection error scenario tp ⊆ A, fp = A − tp, tn ⊆ N , and
fn = N − tn is
C(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) = Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) ·∆J . (5.7)
where Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) is obtained using (5.5) and ∆J is obtained using (5.6).
Worst-Case Analysis. Since the sets of false positives and false negatives are not know a
priori, we need to consider any possible scenario, and find the worst-cases. We define the worst-case
loss due to detection errors below.
Definition 1 (Worst-Case Detection Error Loss). Given the thresholds τ and the residuals r, the
worst-case loss due to detection errors is defined as
L(τ ) = max
tp⊆A,tn⊆N
fp=A−tp
fn=N−tn
C(τ , tp, fp, tn,fn) ,
(5.8)
where C(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) is defined as (5.7), and A and N are found using (5.3).
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5.4.3 Formulation of Application-Aware Detector
Application-Aware Detector
To obtain resilience against the utility loss due to detection errors, the designer must choose
the thresholds that result in the best performance with respect to the worst-case loss (5.8). An
application-aware anomaly detector achieves this by finding the optimal thresholds τ ∗.
Definition 2 (Application-Aware Detector). The Application-Aware Anomaly Detector is the de-
tector that minimizes the loss (5.8) by finding the optimal thresholds τ ∗, in other words
τ ∗ ∈ argmin
τ
L(τ ) . (5.9)
If we are not able to change the thresholds at each timestep, and instead can change thresholds
every T timesteps, we define
L¯(τ ) =
1
T
T∑
k=1
Lk(τ ) , (5.10)
and then we find thresholds that minimize the above equation.
Definition 3. The Application-Aware Detector in a time period T , is the detector that minimizes
the loss (5.10) by finding the optimal thresholds τ ∗, in other words
τ ∗ ∈ argmin
τ
L¯(τ ) . (5.11)
Clearly, (5.9) is a special case of (5.11) as the latter becomes the former when T = 1.
5.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze and solve the application-aware detection problems (5.9) and (5.11).
First, we analyze the problem of worst-case detection error loss (5.8), and we prove that solving this
problem is computationally challenging. We then present an efficient algorithm to obtain approxi-
mately optimal solutions. Second, we present Algorithm 5.3 to solve the application-aware detection
problem (5.9) and obtain near-optimal thresholds. Finally, we propose Algorithm 5.4 to solve the
problem of application-aware detection in a time period. The algorithm implements a variation of
simulated annealing algorithm and finds near-optimal detection thresholds.
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5.5.1 Algorithm for Worst-Case Detection Error Loss Problem
We begin our analysis by studying the computational complexity of finding worst-case loss due to
detection errors (5.8). To this end, we formulate the problem of finding a worst-case loss as a decision
problem.
Definition 4 (Worst-Case Detection Error Problem (Decision Version)). Given a set of sensors S,
detection thresholds τ , residuals r, and desired loss L∗, determine whether there exists a detection
error scenario that incurs the detection error loss of at least L∗.
The following theorem establishes the computational complexity of finding a worst-case detection
error.
Theorem 1. Worst-Case Detection Error Problem (WCDE) is NP-Hard.
Proof. We prove the above theorem using a reduction from a well-known NP-hard problem, the
Maximum Independent Set Problem.
Definition 5 (Maximum Independent Set Problem (Decision Version)). Given an undirected graph
G = (V,E) and a threshold cardinality k, determine whether there exists an independent set of nodes
(i.e., a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any two nodes in the set) of cardinality k.
Given an instance of the Maximum Independent Set Problem (MIS), that is, a graph G = (V,E)
and a threshold cardinality k, we construct an instance of the WCDE as follows:
• Let the set of sensors be S := V .
• Let ps = 0 and ms = 1 for every sensor s ∈ S.
• For every sensor s ∈ S, let τs =  where  < 1, so that A = S and N = ∅.
• Let TPs(τs) = FPs(τs) = TNs(τs) = FNs(τs) = 0.5 for every sensor s ∈ S.
• Let the dimension of the control signal be |S|. For each element i of u, let ui ∈ {0, 1}.
• Let the utility function be J(w, u) = ‖w ◦ u‖1 if the non-zero elements in w form a non-empty
independent set, and −‖u‖1 otherwise.
• Finally, let the threshold loss be L∗ :=
(
1
2
)|S|
k.
Clearly, the above reduction can be performed in polynomial time. Hence, it remains to show
that the constructed instance of WCDE has a solution if and only if the given instance of MIS does.
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MIS then WCDE. First, suppose that MIS has a solution, that is, there exists an independent
set I of k nodes. We claim that the set fp = I and tp = S − I is a solution to WCDE. We have
∆J = J∗(ptp ∪mfp)− J(ptp ∪mfp, U(pA))) = J∗(mfp)− J(mfp, <0>|S|i∈1) = ‖mfp‖1 − 0 = k
Since Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) =
(
1
2
)|S|
for any given sets of detection error, we obtain L(τ ) =
(
1
2
)|S| · k.
Not MIS then Not WCDE. Second, suppose that MIS has no solution, that is, every set of
at least k nodes is non-independent. Then, we have that J(w, u) < k for every w; otherwise, there
would exist a set of at least k nodes in I that are independent of each other, which would contradict
our supposition. Then, since Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) =
(
1
2
)|S|
, we conclude L(τ ) <
(
1
2
)|S| · k.
We present Algorithm 5.2 which uses a greedy approach to obtain the worst-case loss due to
detection errors. The algorithm starts considering a scenario of perfect detection, that is, tp = A,
fp = ∅, tn = N and fn = ∅. In each iteration, the algorithm moves an element from either tp or
tn to respectively fp or fn that maximally increases the utility loss. If no such element exists, the
algorithm terminates with the best solution found so far.
The runtime of Algorithm 5.2 depends on the function J , which depends on the considered
application. If there is an oracle that computes U(w) and J(w, U(w)) in constant time, the runtime
of Algorithm 5.2 is linear with respect to |S|. That is, the runtime of Algorithm 5.2 is O(|S|).
5.5.2 Algorithm for Application-Aware Detection Problem
To solve the application-aware detection problem, we first prove the following lemma. The lemma
shows that the application-aware detection problem is equal to the problem of selecting a set of
normal sensors N and a set of anomalous sensors A, which has a much smaller search space than
the original problem.
Lemma 1. For sensor s with residual rs, the optimal threshold with respect to (5.9) satisfies
τs ∈ {0, rs, r+s ,M}.
Proof. We need to prove that for sensor s with residual rs, the optimal threshold with respect to
(5.9) is in the set {0, rs, r+s ,M}. First, let us recall that the optimal threshold is
τ ∗ ∈ argmin
τ
max
tp⊆A,tn⊆N
fp=A−tp
fn=N−tn
Pr(τ , tp, fp, tn, fn) ·∆J ,
where ∆J = J∗(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn)− J(ptp ∪mfp ∪mtn ∪ pfn, U(pA ∪mN )).
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Algorithm 5.2 Algorithm for Computing Worst-Case Loss
1: function Worst Loss(τ ,m,p)
2: for all s ∈ S do
3: (|ms − ps| ≤ τs) ? N ← N ∪ {s} : A← A ∪ {s}
4: end for
5: tp← A, fp← ∅
6: tn← N , fn← ∅
7: L∗ ← 0
8: while tp 6= ∅ or tn 6= ∅ do
9: (Ci, i)← maxi⊆tp C(τ , tp \ i, fp ∪ {i}, tn, fn)
10: (Cj , j)← maxj⊆tn C(τ , tp, fp, tn \ j, fn ∪ {j})
11: if Ci < Lj then
12: C ← Cj
13: tn← tn \ j
14: fn← fn ∪ {j}
15: else
16: C ← Ci
17: tp← tp \ i
18: fp← fp ∪ {i}
19: end if
20: if C∗ < C then
21: C∗ ← C
22: else
23: return C∗
24: end if
25: end while
26: return C∗
27: end function
Suppose there exists a set of optimal thresholds τ ∗ such that some of its elements are not in the
set mentioned above. Let s be one such sensor, that is, τ∗s 6∈ {0, rs, r+s ,M}. First, let 0 < τ∗s < rs.
Clearly, ∆J(τ ∗) = ∆J(τ−s∪{0}) = ∆J(τ−s∪{rs}). Then, we write Pr(τ
′,tp,fp,tn,fn)
Pr(τ∗,tp,fp,tn,fn) =
TPs(τ
′
s)
TPs(τ∗s )
> 1
if τ ′s = 0, and so τ
∗
s can not be the optimal threshold if s is in the set of true positives. Also,
Pr(τ ′,tp,fp,tn,fn)
Pr(τ∗,tp,fp,tn,fn) =
FPs(τ
′
s)
FPs(τ∗s )
> 1 if τ ′s = rs, and so τ
∗
s can not be the optimal threshold if s is in
the set of false positives either. Second, let r+s < τ
∗
s < M . Again, we have ∆J(τ
∗) = ∆J(τ−s ∪
{r+s }) = ∆J(τ−s ∪ {M}). Then, we write Pr(τ
′,tp,fp,tn,fn)
Pr(τ∗,tp,fp,tn,fn) =
TNs(τ
′
s)
TNs(τ∗s )
> 1 if τ ′s = M . Also,
Pr(τ ′,tp,fp,tn,fn)
Pr(τ∗,tp,fp,tn,fn) =
FNs(τ
′
s)
FNs(τ∗s )
> 1 if τ ′s = r
+
s . This means that τ
∗
s can not be the optimal threshold if s
is in the set of true negatives or false negatives either. This contradicts our supposition, and thus,
τs 6∈ {0, rs, r+s ,M} can never be correct. This concludes our proof.
Following the above lemma, we present Algorithm 5.3 to obtain application-aware detection
thresholds. The algorithm begins by initializing all sensors as normal, that is, N = S and A = ∅. In
each iteration, the algorithm moves a sensor from N to A, which maximally decreases the worst-case
loss. To compute the worst-case loss, Algorithm 5.2 is used.
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Algorithm 5.3 Algorithm for Design of Application-Aware Detector
1: function Application Aware(m,p)
2: N ← S, A← ∅
3: L∗ ←∞
4: while A 6= S do
5: (L, s)← argmins∈NWorst Loss(A ∪ {s}, N \ {s},m,p)
6: if L∗ < L then
7: L∗ ← L
8: A← A ∪ {s}
9: N ← N \ {s}
10: else
11: return L∗
12: end if
13: end while
14: return L∗
15: end function
Similar to the previous algorithm, the running time depends on the function J and the considered
application. If there is an oracle that returns U(w) and J(w, U(w)) in constant time, the runtime
of Algorithm 5.3 is O(|S|2).
5.5.3 Algorithm for Application-Aware Detection in a Time Period
We present Algorithm 5.4 which solves the problem of application-aware detection in a time period
T (2). The algorithm is based on a variation of simulated annealing algorithm, and finds near-
optimal thresholds τ . The idea is to start with an arbitrary solution τ and improving it iteratively.
In each iteration, we generate a new candidate solution τ ′ in the neighborhood of τ . If the candidate
solution τ ′ is better in minimizing the loss, then the current solution is replaced with the new one.
However, if τ ′ increases the loss, the new solution replaces the current solution with only a small
probability. This probability depends on the difference between the two solutions in terms of loss as
well as a temperature parameter which is a decreasing function of the number of iterations. These
random replacements decreases the likelihood of getting stuck in a local minimum.
In Algorithm 5.4, Perturb(τ , n) defines the neighborhood of τ in the nth iteration, from which
τ ′ is randomly sampled. More specifically, Perturb(τ , n) means that each τs in τ is replaced by
τ ′s = τs + ∆τs. Here, for each s ∈ S, ∆τs is randomly picked from the uniform distribution over[
−α
(
nmax−n
nmax
)
, α
(
nmax−n
nmax
)]
for some α ∈ R+. Moreover, since τ ′s is nonnegative, we replace it
with 0 if τ ′s < 0.
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Algorithm 5.4 Algorithm for Design of the Application-Aware in a Time Period
1: Input: m, p
2: Initialize: τ , n← 1, T0
3: L(τ )←Worst Loss(τ ,m,p)
4: while n ≤ nmax do
5: τ ′ ← Perturb(τ , n)
6: L(τ ′)←Worst Loss(τ ′,m,p)
7: c← e(L(τ ′)−L(τ ))/T
8: if (L(τ ′) < L(τ )) ∨ (rand(0, 1) ≤ c) then
9: τ ← τ ′, L(τ )← L(τ ′)
10: end if
11: T ← T0 · e−βn
12: n← n+ 1
13: end while
14: return τ
5.6 Special Cases
In this section, we consider two special cases for the application-aware detection problem (5.9). The
first special case is single detector, which means that either there is a single detector in the system or
each detector is optimized independently and irrespective of other detectors. The second special case
is detectors with equal thresholds, where there are multiple detectors that have the same thresholds..
5.6.1 Single Detector
Consider a scenario where |S| = 1. This means that either there is a single detector in the system,
or each detector is optimized independently and irrespective of other detectors. Let S = {a} be
the considered sensor, and let ra = |pa −ma| be the residual of the sensor at a timestep. First, we
consider a threshold τ ′a where ra > τ
′
a for this sensor. This threshold results in a detection alert,
and so the set of marked-anomalous sensors becomes A = {a} and the set of marked-normal sensors
becomes N = ∅. Next, to find the worst-case detection error loss (5.8) for this threshold, there are
two possibilities for tp: 1) tp = {a} and fp = ∅, and 2) tp = ∅ and fp = {a}. For tp = {a}, i.e., no
detection error, we can write
C(τ ′a, {a}, ∅, ∅, ∅) = TP (τ ′a) ·
(
J(pa, U(pa))− J(pa, U(pa))
)
= 0 .
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For the second scenario, i.e., tp = ∅ and fp = {a}, we should have used the measurement ma but
we used the prediction pa, and so the expected utility loss is
C(τ ′a, ∅, {a}, ∅, ∅) = FP (τ ′a) ·
(
J(ma, U(ma))− J(ma, U(pa))
)
.
Therefore, the worst-case utility loss for the threshold τ ′a, where ra > τ
′
a, is obtained using
L(τ ′a) = maxC(τ
′
a, ∅, {a}, ∅, ∅) = C(r−a , ∅, {a}, ∅, ∅)
Next, we consider a threshold τ ′′a such that ra ≤ τ ′′a . This threshold results in no detection
alert, and so A = ∅ and N = {a}. To compute the worst-case detection error loss, there are two
possibilities for detection error: 1) tn = {a} and fn = ∅, and 2) tn = ∅ and fn = {a}. Similar to
the above scenario, for the first case which corresponds to no detection error, we obtain ∆J = 0 and
so C(τ ′′a , ∅, ∅, {a}, ∅) = 0. For the second case, we obtain
C(τ ′′a , ∅, ∅, ∅, {a}) = FN(τ ′′a ) ·
(
J(pa, U(pa))− J(pa, U(ma))
)
.
Therefore, the worst-case detection error loss for the threshold τ ′′a , where ra ≤ τ ′′a , is
L(τ ′′a ) = maxC(τ
′′
a , ∅, ∅, ∅, {a}) = C(ra, ∅, ∅, ∅, {a}) .
The application-aware detector selects the threshold τ∗a ∈ {r−a , ra} that solves
min(C(r−a , ∅, {a}, ∅, ∅), C(ra, ∅, ∅, ∅, {a}) ) .
In other words, the optimal threshold is
τa =

r−a if C(r
−
a , ∅, {a}, ∅, ∅) ≤ C(ra, ∅, ∅, ∅, {a})
ra otherwise
. (5.12)
5.6.2 Detectors with Equal Thresholds
We consider a case where all detectors have equal thresholds. Let τ¯ represent this threshold value,
that is, τ¯ = τ1 = . . . = τd. Next, let r1, r2, . . . , rd be the residual values. The result below is a direct
consequence of Lemma 1.
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Algorithm 5.5 Application-Aware Detector for Equal Thresholds
Input: m, p
1: r ← |m− p|
2: for all τ¯ ∈ SolutionSpace do
3: (L(τ¯), τ¯)← Worst Loss(τ¯ ,m,p)
4: end for
5: τ¯∗ ← argmin(L(τ¯), τ¯)
6: return τ¯∗
Corollary 1. The optimal threshold τ¯ for detectors with equal thresholds belongs to the following
set
SolutionSpace = {0, r−1 , r+1 , r−2 , r+2 . . . , r−d , r+d ,M} .
Based on the above corollary, since the solution space is finite, we can find the optimal thresholds
by a linear-time search, as presented by Algorithm 5.5.
5.7 Experiment
In this section, we apply our approach to a case study of max-pressure control of traffic signals
in a traffic network. First, we construct regression-based anomaly detectors for traffic sensors,
and we generate the trade-off curves for their performance. Then, we implement the application-
aware detector, and evaluate its performance compared to a baseline “application-unaware” detector.
Throughout the section, we use SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility), which is a micro simulator
for traffic applications [14].
Traffic Network
Consider a traffic network in a 3-by-3 grid with a total of 9 intersections, as show in Figure 5.4. Each
intersection connects 4 standard two-way lanes with four possible movements {EW, WE, NS, SN}.
Traffic volume of each movement is monitored by the set of sensors S = {sEW , sWE , sNS , sSN}.
The sensors send traffic measurements m = {mEW ,mWE ,mNS ,mSN} at each timestep. Each
traffic signal has two phases Φ = {φ{EW,WE}, φ{NS,SN}}. The max-pressure controller computes
the optimal stage u∗ ∈ Φ using (5.2).
The utility (i.e., pressure-release) function of the traffic network can be written as sum of the
pressure-release of each individual intersection, and for each intersection, the utility depends only
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Figure 5.4: The 3-by-3 grid.
Figure 5.5: Each intersection in the 3-by-3 grid. For illustration, a critical and a redundant sensor
are shown in the figure. For each lane, a second redundant sensor is placed with twice as much
distance as the distance between the first redundant sensor and the critical sensor. All 8 total
redundant sensors are used to predict the value of a sensor.
on its corresponding lanes. This means that maximizing the pressure-release of the traffic network
is equal to maximizing the pressure-release of individual intersections, and so the application-aware
threshold of each intersection can be designed independently of other intersections. Based on this
observation, in what follows, we discuss how the detector is designed for an intersection and then
extend it to all intersections.
Anomaly Model. Traffic measurements may be anomalous due to failures or other undesired
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events. To simulate the negative effects of anomalies on the system, we consider several realistic
anomaly models [139],
1. Overcount : Additive error equal to 3% to 7% of the actual values, i.e., es(k) = usas(k) and
0.03 ≤ us ≤ 0.07.
2. Undercount : Subtractive error equal to 7% to 13% of the actual values, i.e., es(k) = usas(k)
and −0.13 ≤ us ≤ −0.07.
3. Gaussian Noise: Error with zero mean and standard deviation σ = 15 to σ = 35, i.e., es(k) ∼
N (0, σ2) and 15 ≤ σ ≤ 35.
Regression-Based Detector and Trade-off Curves
To protect the system against anomalies, we construct anomaly detectors. We suppose there are 8 (2
on each side) redundant sensors that are adjacent to the four critical sensors mentioned above. We
use the values of these sensors to design regression-based anomaly detectors for the critical sensors.
As discussed in the preceding chapters, such detector consists of two main components: 1) Predictor
and 2) Statistical Test.
Predictor. We collect simulation data that represents the traffic behavior under normal oper-
ation. We simulate the network for 4 hours considering a Poisson distribution as the demand for
each movement. We collect sensor measurements in 10-second aggregates. The data from the first
2 hours is used to train the predictors, and the data from the remaining 2 hours is used to obtain
the trade-off curves. Following our previous discussion, for each predictor, we use the current value
of the 8 redundant sensors as the features. Then, we train the predictor using linear regression
algorithm. We obtain the performance metrics MSEtrain = 2.14 and MSEtest = 2.87. Note that
more complex regression algorithms (e.g., Gaussian Processes [47]) can be used as well, however, we
obtained satisfactory result with a simple linear regression model.
Trade-off Curve. To generate the trade-off curve, first, we simulate the anomalies on the test
data, and evaluate the performance of the detector by counting the number of true positives and false
negatives. Similarly, we simulate the system under normal operation and evaluate the performance
of the detector to obtain the number of true negatives and false positives. We repeat the steps while
varying the detection threshold in order to obtain the trade-off curve (i.e., true positive probability
as a function of false positive probability). Figure 5.6 shows the resulting trade-off curve.
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Figure 5.6: Trade-off between true positive and false positive errors for sEW .
Application-Aware Detector
Given the trade-off curve, we implement the application-aware detector by finding the detection
thresholds that minimize the worst-case expected utility loss. First, we show how the optimal
threshold can be computed at each single timestep. Then, we present the results.
Computing the Optimal Threshold. To show how the optimal threshold is computed at
each timestep, suppose mNS = pNS = 15 at a given timestep. Further, suppose there is no traffic
on SN and WE. If wEW ≥ 15, the max-pressure controller selects the stage u = φ{EW,WE}, and
otherwise, it selects u = φ{NS,SN}. Next, consider the following scenarios for mEW and pEW :
1. mEW = 30 and pEW = 10. In this case, the threshold that solves the following equation is the opti-
mal threshold: min
(
C(20−, ∅, {sEW }, ∅, ∅), C(20, ∅, ∅, ∅, {sEW })
)
, where C(20−, ∅, {sEW }, ∅, ∅) =
FP (20−)· (J∗(30)−J(30, U(10))) = 30−15 = 15 , and C(20, ∅, ∅, ∅, {sEW }) = FN(20)· (J∗(10))−
J(10, U(30))
)
= 15 − 10 = 5 . Thus, the optimal threshold is τ∗ = 20. To see why this is the
optimal threshold, note that if τ = 20, then there will be no detection alert and the measurement
(mEW = 30) will be used in computing the optimal control input (which is EW ). If this is incor-
rect (due to a false negative), then pSE = 10 is the actual value. In this case, the pressure-release
of φ{NS,SN} will be 10. In the perfect detection case (no detection error), we could have obtained
15 by selecting NS. Thus, the detection error loss is 15− 10 = 5. On the other hand, if τ = 20−,
the prediction will be used by the controller. This results in the movement NS being selected.
However, if there is a false positive, which means mEW = 30 is the actual value, then EW should
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Figure 5.7: Utility (i.e., pressure-release) during a 2-hour interval.
have been selected as the optimal stage, which could have obtained a utility of 30. Thus, the
utility loss in this case is 30−15 = 15, which is larger than the utility loss for the other threshold.
2. mEW = 30, pEW = 10, and aNS = 25. The application-aware detector computes the minimum
of FP−(20) · (J∗(30) − J(30, U(10))) = 30 − 25 = 5, and FN(20) · (J∗(10) − J(10, U(30))) =
25− 10 = 15. In this case, the threshold τ = 20− is the optimal threshold.
3. mEW = 30, pEW = 25, and aNS = 15. The application-aware detector computes FP (20
−) ·(
J∗(30) − J(30, U(25))) = 30 − 30 = 0 and FN(20) · (J∗(25) − J(25, U(30))) = 25 − 25 = 0,
which means that both thresholds are optimal. The same results can be obtained if aNS ≥ mEW
and aNS ≥ pEW .
Comparison. We now compare the results to a baseline detector that does not take into account
the underlying application in the detector configuration. The threshold of the baseline detector is
selected such that it obtains a false alarm probability equal to the false alarm probability of the
application-aware detector. That is, we calculate the total number of false alarms for the application-
aware detector, and then select the threshold that obtains the same false alarm probability for the
baseline. In this case, in 2 hours of evaluation time where each of the anomalies may occur with
probability of 0.05, each application-aware detector on average had a false alarm probability of 0.047.
The threshold values for the application-aware detector varied from 1.3 to 26.5 with a mean of 5.6.
The threshold for the baseline detector is selected as 3.9.
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Figure 5.7 shows the pressure-release comparison between the two cases during the 2-hour inter-
val. Each tick in the figure aggregates the results from 12 minutes (i.e., 72 timesteps). Based on
the results, the application-aware detector performs better than the baseline detector in most cases.
Baseline detector performs only slight better in the aggregated timestep 0.8 which could be due to
detection errors by the application-aware detector. However, in the rest of the period, the proposed
detector performs better.
5.8 Conclusions
We presented the application-aware anomaly detection framework for detection anomalies in sensor
measurements in cyber-physical systems. An application-aware anomaly detector configures itself
such that the application performance in the presence of detection errors is as close as possible to
the performance that could have been obtained if there were no detection errors. We evaluated our
result using a case study of real-time control of traffic signals, and showed that our application-aware
detector significantly outperforms several baseline detectors.
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Chapter 6
Adversarial Regression for Stealthy Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
Attacks manipulating the sensor measurements of a cyber-physical system (CPS) can be tuned by
the attacker to cause a spectrum of damages. Attackers can attempt to remain undetected and hide
their sensor manipulations by following the expected behavior of the system, while manipulating
just enough sensor information that achieves their malicious goals. In this chapter, we study the
problem of adversarial regression in CPS. We consider a safety-critical CPS that is monitored by
regression-based anomaly detectors. An adversary attempts to drive the system to an unsafe state
by perturbing the values of a subset of sensors while remaining undetected. We solve the adversarial
regression problem, considering linear regression- and neural network regression-based detectors.
Then, we present a resilient detector that mitigates the impact of stealthy attacks through resilient
configuration of detection thresholds. We numerically evaluate the adversarial regression problem,
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the resilient detector using a case study of a process control
system.
6.1 Introduction
While it is crucial to detect intrusions into safety-critical CPS, most traditional intrusion detectors
are faced with major drawbacks that make them insufficient for CPS. Specification-based detection
methods require precise and accurate definitions of system behavior that may be impossible to
obtain due to system complexity and nonlinearity. Signature-based methods are insufficient since
the system’s dynamics may preclude any succinct signatures that are needed. Further, formal
models are ineffective in real-world CPS applications since they are often simplified to be tractable.
As a solution, data-driven intrusion detectors are proposed which use machine learning models at
their core. Data-driven detectors provide many advantages such as fast and accurate detection,
applicability to complex and nonlinear systems, and relatively simple implementation, which make
them suitable for anomaly and intrusion detection in CPS. Nevertheless, there are concerns about
security vulnerabilities of such detectors. In particular, as previous work on adversarial machine
learning shows, strategic adversaries may be able to exploit vulnerabilities of machine learning
algorithms and evade being detected while achieving their malicious goals [86, 20].
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Although prior studies make significant progress toward design of anomaly detectors for CPS in
adversarial environments, several key gaps remain. First, previous work such as [28, 132] consider
simplified mathematical models of the physical system, and consequently their approach might not
generalize well in realistic environments. Second, while works such as [61, 1] consider data-driven
approaches that can generalize well, they only consider very weak and restrictive attack models (e.g.,
an attacker that can only manipulate one sensor), and thus it is unclear whether the high detection
rates reported in these works are due to the effectiveness of the approach or due to restrictive and
unrealistic attack models.
In this chapter, we study the adversarial regression problem in CPS. We consider a safety-critical
CPS that is monitored by regression-based anomaly detectors. An omniscient adversary that is
capable of perturbing the values of a subset of sensors attempts to drive the system to an unsafe
state (e.g., raising the pressure of a reactor beyond its safety limit in a process control system).
The attacker needs to remain undetected during the duration of the attack. We solve the attacker
problem, which we call the adversarial regression problem, considering different types of regression-
based detectors. In particular, we solve the problem for detectors that use linear regression, neural
network regression, and an ensemble of the two as their regression algorithms. Then, keeping in
mind that it is impossible to completely secure the system against stealthy attacks, we present a
resilient detector that mitigates the impact of stealthy attacks without increasing the number of false
alarms. The resilient detector achieves this by careful selection of detection thresholds. Finally, we
numerically evaluate the adversarial regression problem, and demonstrate the effectiveness of the
resilient detector through applying our methods to a case study of process control systems.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we discuss related work. In
Section 6.3, we define sensor attacks in CPS and present a model of regression-based anomaly
detectors. In Section 6.4, we present the adversarial regression problem for finding worst-case stealthy
attacks against CPS. In Section 6.5, we analyze the adversarial regression problem for anomaly
detectors that use linear regression, neural network, and an ensemble of the two as their regressors.
In Section 6.6, we propose the resilient detector. In Section 6.7, we evaluate our contributions using
a case study of process control systems. Finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 6.8.
6.2 Related Work
Machine learning-based anomaly detectors have been widely studied in the literature as discussed in
Chapter 2. In addition, many different anomaly detectors have been particularly designed for attack
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detection in CPS [132]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is little work that effectively
applies regression-based detectors for attack detection in CPS, and studies their vulnerabilities to
adaptive attackers. This may be due to the lack of publicly available normal data for CPS, or due
to the safety-critical nature of such systems that makes it very challenging to collect attack data,
as doing so may be damaging to the system. Nonetheless, if such limitations in data collection are
overcome, regression-based detectors can be highly effective for anomaly detection in CPS.
Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial learning studies secure adoption of machine learning techniques in adversarial settings.
A categorization of different adversary models is presented in [20]. Further, the work in [15] considers
use of multiple classifiers to obtain better security performance in adversarial settings. A significant
number of recent works study the adversarial learning problem for neural networks used in computer
vision applications [41], [106], [52], [112].
Adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) learning problem was first introduced in [86]. In
ACRE, an adversary launches an attack to minimize a cost function, while having limited information
about the classifier. The adversary is allowed to make polynomial number of membership queries
to modify an attack instance to bypass the classifier with minimal cost. In the paper, a query
algorithm for reverse engineering of linear classifiers is presented. Furthermore, in [31], a framework
for the adversarial learning problem is presented that uses game theory. The paper formulates a
game between a classifier and an adversary, and then assuming that the adversary’s optimal strategy
is known, develops the optimal classifier. Then, experiments are performed which show that the
proposed robust classifier outperforms a standard one.
Machine Learning-Based Attack Detection in CPS
A behavior-based machine learning approach for attack detection in CPS is proposed in [61]. The
work models the physical process of CPS to detect any anomaly or attack that may try to change
the behavior of system. Using a replicate of a real water treatment facility, different data-driven
anomaly detectors are implemented and their performance is evaluated. While this work successfully
applies machine learning algorithms for attack detection in CPS, the considered threat models are
highly simple and restrictive (e.g., attacking only one sensor). Thus, it is unclear whether the
high detection rates reported in the paper are due to the effectiveness of the approach or due to
the restrictive and unrealistic attack models. Using the same testbed, the impact of single-point
cyber-attacks are experimentally investigated in [1]. Cyber-attacks are launched through a SCADA
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server connected to programmable logic controllers that govern the actuators and sensors. Several
experiments are performed considering different objectives for the attacker. Then, based on the
observed experiment results, attack detection mechanisms are proposed. This work also suffers from
the same limitation of considering oversimplified and unrealistic attack scenarios.
Data-driven anomaly detection is studied using a miniature industrial gas system with a few
sensors and actuators in [102]. To detect attacks, one physical process attribute (i.e., pressure in
pipeline) and two one-class classifiers (i.e., support vector data description and kernel principal com-
ponent analysis) are used. Then, different attack scenarios are considered to evaluate the detection
performance. According to the results presented in the paper, while single-point attacks have a
detection rate of 99.25 percent, more complicated attacks have much lower detection rates of ap-
proximately 65-70 percent. This shows that the performance of the detector significantly decreases
when faced by complex attacks. Further, an intrusion detection method based on neural networks
is investigated using a water testbed that contains a tank, pump, and level sensor [45]. Network
traffic, SCADA mode, water level, and pump status are used as the attributes, and then the method
is evaluated considering malicious attacks on the level sensor. Finally, using the same testbed, a
one-class approach is studied in [103].
6.3 System Model
In this section, we define sensor attacks in CPS. We then present a regression-based anomaly detector
for detecting sensor attacks.
Notation
Each element s of vector y at timestep k is denoted by yks . We omit the timestep symbol unless we
need to distinguish between several timesteps. Further, parameter x of detector s is described by
x(s). For a list of symbols used in this chapter, see Table 6.1.
6.3.1 Sensor Attacks in CPS
Consider a CPS such as an industrial process control system or an intelligent transportation system,
that is monitored by a set of sensors. Sensors may be under attack by malicious adversaries that
have penetrated into the system through exploiting zero-day security vulnerabilities. If sensor s ∈ S
is under attack, there is a discrepancy between the actual and observed measured values. In other
words, if yk is the actual value and y˜k is the observed measurement at timestep k, for an attacked
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Table 6.1: List of Symbols
Symbol Description
S Set of sensors
ys Actual value of sensor s
y˜s Observed measurement value of sensor s
yˆs Predicted value of sensor s
rs residual of sensor s ∈ S
Sc Set of critical sensors
δs Error added to sensor s ∈ S
B Budget of the attacker
D Set of sensors with detectors
f (s) Regression-based predictor of detector s ∈ D
τ (s) Threshold value of detector s ∈ D
sensor s, we have y˜(k) = yk + δks , where δ
k
s is the added error value at timestep k.
Undetected sensor attacks may cause significant harm to the system and degrade the performance
extensively. This is because corrupted measurements transmitted to the controller may result in
control decisions which lead the system to an undesirable or unsafe state. For example, as we show
in our experiments for a process control system, undetected attacks may result in disastrous events
such as reactor explosion.
6.3.2 Regression-Based Anomaly Detection
To protect the system against sensors attacks, we must detect them quickly and accurately. Many
different anomaly detection systems have been proposed in the literature. For a comprehensive
review of anomaly detection methods, we refer the reader to [29] for data-driven detectors and [132]
for detectors used in CPS. In this work, we consider machine learning (ML) regression-based anomaly
detectors due to the many advantages that they provide. ML regression-based detectors: 1) require
no knowledge of the physical system; 2) can take into account complex and nonlinear behaviors of the
system which makes them more realistic (as opposed to detectors that use simplified mathematical
models of the system); and 3) are easy to implement and can be highly scalable depending on the
algorithm that is used.
Figure 6.1 presents the architecture of the ML regression-based anomaly detector. The detector
consists of two components: 1) Predictor and 2) Statistical Test. The predictor predicts the value
of a sensor given some information about the system state (e.g., current value of other sensors,
previous control inputs). Then, the statistical test compares the computed prediction to the observed
measurement and decides whether the sensor is normal or anomalous.
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yˆs = f
(s)(y˜)
Statistical
Test
y˜ yˆs rs
− y˜s
Figure 6.1: Regression-Based Anomaly Detection
6.3.2.1 Predictor
As discussed above, the goal of the predictor is to predict the value of a sensor given some information
about the system state (e.g., value of other sensors at a previous timestep). In other words, for sensor
s, our goal is to find a function f (s) that maps features y˜ to value of sensor s, i.e., yˆs = f
(s)(y˜−s).
To do so, first, large amounts of data that correctly represent the normal system behavior are
collected. Next, for sensor s ∈ S (e.g., the pressure of a reactor), we let the target variable be its
actual value at timestep k, denoted by y˜s(k). Further, as feature variables, we can select the current
or previous values of other sensors, previous control inputs, and other information about the system.
We let y˜ denote such feature vector.
The predictor can be implemented using suitable machine learning regression algorithms. For
example, in this work, we consider linear regression and neural network models. To ensure that the
predictor can successfully generalize, we evaluate it using our hold-out test data. For example, for
the prediction result of our case study, see Figure 6.6.
6.3.2.2 Statistical Test
For each detector s ∈ D, the statistical test efficiently detects attacks or anomalies by comparing the
measured value y˜s(k) with the predicted value yˆs(k). Given a set of measured values y˜ and predicted
values yˆ, residual signals are computed as r = |yˆ − y˜|. Then, given the residuals, the statistical test
makes detection decisions d = {ds}s∈D, where for each sensor s, the decision ds is either normal or
anomalous.
Different detection algorithms can be used to implement the statistical test [11]. In this work,
we consider a stateless threshold-based detector defined as follows. Given detection threshold
τ (s) ∈ R+, for detector of sensor s, if the residual rs is less than or equal to the threshold
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τ (s), then sensor s is marked normal and otherwise, s is marked anomalous. Thus
ds =

normal if rs ≤ τ (s)
anomalous otherwise
. (6.1)
6.4 Adversarial Regression
In this section, we present the adversarial regression problem for CPS. The idea is to find a stealthy
sensor attack that maximizes the deviation from the actual value for some critical sensor. We
describe this in more detail below. Figure 6.2 illustrates the adversarial regression problem.
Threat Model We define the attack model by describing the attacker’s capability, knowledge,
objective, and strategy [20]. Capability: The adversary may control a subset of sensors and perturb
their values. The cardinality of this subset has an upper bound B. Knowledge: We consider a
worst-case scenario where the attacker has complete knowledge of the system, anomaly detectors,
implementations, and so on. Objective: The attacker’s objective is to maximize or minimize the
observed value for some critical sensor a ∈ Sc. Strategy: The attack must remain undetected
during its entire duration.
Formally, the attacker adds bias δ to the actual measurements and transmits corrupted mea-
surements y˜ = y + δ to the controller. For a given critical sensor a ∈ Sc, the attacker’s goal is
to maximize or minimize the observed measurement y˜s. As an example, the attacker may wish
to increase the pressure of a reactor to unsafe levels. To accomplish this, (s)he would manipulate
observed sensor measurements by transmitting smaller-than-desired pressure values, which triggers
the controller to increase the pressure. Here we focus on maximization of observed values of critical
sensors; minimization can be accomplished similarly.
The main constraint faced by the attacker is to remain stealthy, as determined by the operation
of the anomaly detector, since otherwise the attack is detected and can be mitigated. Formally,
for any detector s ∈ D with threshold τ (s), the difference between the prediction f (s)(y˜) and the
measurement y˜s must be smaller than or equal to the threshold, i.e., |y˜s − f (s)(y˜)| ≤ τ (s). The
attacker can manipulate at most B sensors due to constrained resources. Further, the value of any
sensor i ∈ S can change at most by ηi between two consecutive observations, i.e., |y˜i − y˜previ | ≤ ηi,
where y˜previ is the sensor value at the previous timestep [91].
We formally define the adversarial regression problem below.
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Figure 6.2: Attack Model
Definition 1 (Adversarial Regression). Given an anomaly detector, a set of critical sensors Sc, and
an attack budget B, the adversarial regression problem finds an optimal attack that maximizes the
observed measurement for some critical sensor, while evading the detector during the entire duration
of the attack. In other words,
argmax
a∈Sc
max
y˜
y˜a
s.t. |y˜s − f (s)(y˜)| ≤ τ (s),∀s ∈ D
|y˜i − y˜k−1i | ≤ ηi,∀i ∈ S
‖y˜ − y‖0 ≤ B
(6.2)
6.5 Analysis of Adversarial Regression Problem
We begin our analysis by showing that the adversarial regression problem is, in general, NP-Hard.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Regression Problem (Decision Version)). Given an anomaly detector, a
set of critical sensors Sc, an attack budget B, and a threshold attack y˜
∗
c , determine whether there
exists an attack with a value of at least y˜∗c .
Proposition 1. The Adversarial Regression Problem is NP-Hard.
We prove this proposition using a reduction from a well-known NP-hard problem, the Maximum
Independent Set Problem.
Definition 3 (Maximum Independent Set Problem (Decision Version)). Given an undirected graph
G = (V,E) and a threshold cardinality k, determine whether there exists an independent set of nodes
(i.e., a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any two nodes in the set) of cardinality k.
Proof. Given an instance of the Maximum Independent Set Problem (MIS), that is, a graph G =
(V,E) and a threshold cardinality k, we construct an instance of the Adversarial Regression Problem
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(ARP) as follows: 1) Let the set of sensors be S := V ∪ {c}, where c is not connected to any node,
and let Sc := {c} be the only critical sensor in the system. 2) Let D := S. For each detector s ∈ D,
let τ (s) := 0. Further, let f (s)(y˜) be the number of nonzero elements in y˜, if y˜s 6= 0 and those
elements form an independent set, and zero otherwise. 3) Let ys := 0 for every sensor s ∈ S. 4) Let
B := k + 1. 5) Finally, let the threshold objective be y∗c := k + 1.
Clearly, the above reduction can be performed in polynomial time. Hence, it remains to show
that the constructed instance of ARP has a solution if and only if the given instance of MIS does.
First, suppose that MIS has a solution, that is, there exists an independent set A of k nodes.
We claim that the set A′ = A ∪ {c} where y˜s = k + 1 for every s ∈ A′, and y˜s = 0 otherwise,
is a solution to ARP. For nonzero sensors, since A′ is independent, the value of f (s)(y˜) is equal
to the number of nonzero sensors in A′, which is equal to k + 1. This satisfies the stealthiness
constraint since for nonzero sensors |y˜s− f (s)(y˜)| = |k+ 1− (k+ 1)| = 0 ≤ τ (s), and for zero sensors
|y˜s − f (s)(y˜)| = |0− 0| = 0 ≤ τ (s). Clearly, the budget constraint is also satisfied, and so y∗c = k + 1
is obtained.
Second, suppose that MIS has no solution, that is, every set of at least k nodes is non-independent.
As a consequence, we have f (s)(y˜) < k + 1 for every detector, since otherwise, there would exist a
set of at least k + 1 nodes (which could include c) that are independent of each other, which would
contradict our supposition. Since |y˜c − f (c)(y˜)| < τc = 0 implies that y˜c = f (c), ARP cannot have a
solution, which concludes our proof.
Despite the hardness result, we now present algorithmic approaches for solving the adversarial
regression problem (6.2) in the context of two widely-used machine learning algorithms: linear
regression and neural networks.
6.5.1 Linear Regression
Suppose that the predictor of each ML regression-based anomaly detector implements a linear re-
gression model. In other words, for each detector s ∈ D, we let the predictor be a linear regression
model defined as f (s)(y˜) = w(s)
T
y˜ + b(s), where w(s)
T ∈ Rm and b(s) ∈ R are the parameters of
the linear regression model. Clearly, we also have w
(s)
s = 0. In this case, the first constraint of the
adversarial regression problem (6.2) becomes a set of linear equations. That is, for each s ∈ D, the
constraint |y˜s − f (s)(y˜)| ≤ τ (s) will be written as |y˜s − w(s)T y˜ − b(s)| ≤ τ (s).
For all i ∈ S, we replace y˜i with y˜i = yi +αiδi, where αi = 1 implies that the sensor is attacked,
and αi = 0 implies that the sensor is not attacked. Thus, the third constraint (i.e., ‖y˜ − y‖0 ≤ B)
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can also be re-written as
∑m
i=1 αi ≤ B. Further, we remove αi from each αiδi term, and instead add
a new constraint δi ≤Mαi where M ∈ R is a large number.
Next, we let u(s) = w(s) − es, where es is a one-hot vector with value of 1 at index s and 0 at
other indices. We place all the coefficient vectors u(s) in a matrix as follows, U =
[
u(s1) . . . u(sd)
]T
.
We also let γ(s) = τ (s) − ys + w(s)T y, and then define Γ =
[
γ(s1)
...γ(sd)
]T
. The first constraint
of (6.2) then becomes Uδ ≤ Γ. Similarly, for negative operand values in the absolute operator, we
let γ(s)
′
= τ (s) + ys − w(s)T y and we place them in a matrix Γ′ to obtain the constraint −Uδ ≤ Γ′.
Hence, we obtain the following mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which solves
the adversarial regression problem (6.2) for linear regression
argmax
a∈Sc
max
δ,α
δa
s.t. Uδ ≤ Γ, −Uδ ≤ Γ′
δ ≤Mα
|δi| ≤ ηi,∀i ∈ S
m∑
i=1
αi ≤ B
∀i ∈ S : δi ∈ R, αi ∈ {0, 1}.
(6.3)
6.5.2 Neural Network
Next, suppose the predictor of each ML regression-based detector implements a neural network
regression model. In other words, for each detector s ∈ D, we let the predictor f (s) be a feed-
forward neural network model defined by parameters θ(s), where the prediction yˆs = f(y˜) is obtained
by computing a forward-propagation. Because of the neural networks, the first constraint of the
adversarial regression problem now becomes a set of highly nonlinear functions, and so we are not
able to use techniques from linear optimization as in the previous section.
To tackle this challenge and be able to approximately solve (6.2), we present Algorithm 6.1.
The algorithm solves the problem by making small steps in a direction that optimally increases
the objective function. At each iteration, the algorithm linearizes the neural networks for all the
detectors at their operating points, and replaces them with the obtained linearized instances. Then,
for each small step, it uses (6.3) to solve the adversarial regression problem. At each iteration, in
order to ensure that the obtained solution is feasible, the algorithm tests the solution in the actual
space. If it is infeasible, the iteration is repeated considering a smaller step size. Otherwise, the
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Algorithm 6.1 Adversarial Regression for Neural Network
Input: Measurements y˜, critical sensors Sc, budget B, algorithm parameters 0, min, nmax
1: y˜0 ← y˜, δa∗ ← 0, ← 0
2: for all a ∈ Sc do
3: while number of iterations ¡ nmax and  ¿ min do
// Linearize the neural networks for all the detectors at y˜
4: for all s ∈ D do
5: for all i ∈ S do
6: w
(s)
i ← ∂f
(s)(y˜)
∂y˜i
7: end for
8: end for
9: W ← [w(s1)1 . . . w(s1)n ; . . . ;w(sd)1 . . . w(sd)n ]
// Solve MILP and check feasibility
10: y˜′ ←Solve MILP(W ,,a,y˜,y˜0)
11: if ∀s ∈ D : |y˜′s − f (s)(y˜′)| ≤ τ (s) then
12: y˜ ← y˜′
13: δa ← y˜′a
14: ← 0
15: else
16: ← 
2
17: end if
18: end while
19: if δa∗ < δa then
20: a∗ ← a, δa∗ ← δa, y˜∗ ← y˜
21: end if
22: end for
23: return y˜∗
same process is repeated until a local optimum is found or we reach a desired maximum number of
iterations.
The algorithm begins with the initial uncorrupted measurement vector y˜ = y. For each neural
network f (s), it obtains a linearized model by computing the partial derivative of the output f (s)(y˜)
with respect to the inputs at the current operating point y˜, i.e., w¯
(s)
i =
∂f(s)(y˜)
∂y˜i
is computed for all i ∈
S. Then, for detector s ∈ D, the linearized model can be written as f¯ (s)(y˜+ ∆) = f (s)(y˜) + w¯(s)T ∆,
where ∆ ∈ Rm is a small error vector. We denote the coefficients of the linearized models in matrix
form by W = [w(s1) . . . w(sd)]T .
Given matrix W , we solve the problem by converting it to the MILP (6.3) as in the previous
subsection. The difference is that there is now a new constraint that enforces taking small error steps.
In other words, we let  ∈ R+ be the parameter representing the maximum step size. Then, we add
the constraint |δ| <  to the MILP. In addition, we update the budget constraint as ‖δ + ∆‖0 ≤ B,
where ∆ is the error vector added at the current iteration, and δ = y˜ − y is the error added in the
previous iterations.
Let y˜′ be the solution obtained by solving the MILP. We check whether this solution is feasible
by performing forward-propagation in all the neural networks and checking that no stealthiness
constraint is violated. If a stealthiness constraint is violated, which means that our linearized model
was not a good approximation of the neural network, we discard the candidate solution, reduce the
97
Linear Regressor
Neural Network
yˆE =
1
2
(yˆLR + yˆNN )
yˆLR
yˆNN
y˜
y˜
yˆE
Figure 6.3: Ensemble of Neural Network-Linear Regression.
maximum step size parameter  to improve the approximation, and re-solve the MILP. We repeat
this process until a feasible solution is found, in which case the same steps are repeated for a new
operating point, or until we reach the maximum number of iterations nmax. Finally, we check
whether the solution that is found for the current target sensor a outperforms the solution for the
best target sensor found so far. The algorithm terminates after considering all the target sensors
and returns the optimal attack vector.
6.5.3 Neural Network-Linear Regression Ensemble
It has been shown in the adversarial learning literature that multiple detectors may improve ad-
versarial robustness [15]. We explore this idea for the ML regression-based detector by considering
an ensemble model for the predictor. As shown in Figure 6.3, we consider an ensemble predictor
that contains a neural network and a linear regression model. Different methods can be used for
combining the results, but we consider a bagging approach where the result is computed as the
average of the predictors’ outputs.
We can see the ensemble as a single neural network that connects a perceptron (i.e., the linear
regression model) with our initial neural network at the output layer. Thus, to solve the adversarial
regression problem, we can use the same approach as in the case of neural networks by modifying
Algorithm 6.1. That is, in line 9, we compute the linearized coefficient matrix as W = 12 (WNN +
WLR) where WNN is the matrix of linearized weights of the neural networks obtained by computing
the partial derivatives with respect to input, and WLR is the fixed weights of the linear regression
model.
6.6 Resilient Detector Design
In this section, we present an approach to obtain resilience against adversarial regression in CPS.
In particular, we discuss a method to select thresholds for our detectors such that a right balance
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Figure 6.4: Resilient Detector Algorithm.
between the impact of stealthy attacks and the expected time between false alarms. This approach
is inspired by the detection metric proposed in [132].
Impact of Attack and False Alarms Given thresholds τ , we define the impact of attack as
the max value of the adversarial regression problem (6.2) in a time period K = {k1, . . . , kT }, and
we define it as D(τ) = maxk∈K y˜ks − yks . To evaluate false alarms, we let TE be the duration of
an experiment under normal operation. Then, for each detector s ∈ D, the number of false alarms
can be calculated using nFA(s)(τ (s)) =
∑TE
k=1 1|y˜ks−f(s)(y˜k)|>τ(s) . We then calculate the expected
time between false alarms as E[T (s)fa (τ (s))] =
TE
nFA(s)(τ(s))
, and then calculate it for all detectors as
E[Tfa(τ)] =
∑
s∈D E[T
(s)
fa (τ
(s))].
We may be able to reduce the attack impact D(τ) by decreasing the detection threshold. This
can effectively force the attacker to launch attacks that follow the behavior of the physical system.
By following closer the behavior of the system, the attack impact is then reduced as the attack needs
to appear to be a normal behavior of the physical system. However, reducing the threshold will in
turn trigger a higher number of false alarms.
Maintaining a balance between the attack impact and the number of false alarms can be a
challenging problem [46, 74]. We now present a novel algorithm for resilient detector threshold
selection in the context of stealthy sensor attacks described above. Given a desired value for the
expected time between false alarms, the algorithm greedily finds thresholds that minimize the attack
impact while keeping the expected number of false alarms fixed.
Algorithm for Obtaining Resilient Detector Let τ be initialized based on a desired value
for the expected time between false alarms. At each iteration, we solve the adversarial regression
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Algorithm 6.2 Resilient Detector
Initialize: Set thresholds τ based on a desired false alarm performance
1: while number of iterations ¡ nmax do
2: for all a ∈ Sc do
3: (Da(τ), a)← Adversarial Regression(τ, a)
4: end for
5: A∗ ← argmaxA⊆Sc Da(τ)
6: Amin ← argminA⊆Sc Da(τ)
7: for all a ∈ A∗ do
8: τ (a)
′ ← τ (a) − 
9: end for
10: ∆FP ← FP (τ ′)− FP (τ)
11: for all b ∈ Amin do
12: τ (b)
′ ← FP−1b (FPb(τ (b))− 1|Amin|∆FP )
13: end for
14: DA′ (τ
′)← maxa∈Sc Adversarial Regression(τ ′, a)
15: if DA′ (τ
′) ≤ DA∗ (τ) then
16: τ ← τ ′
17: ← 0
18: else
19: ← 
2
20: end if
21: end while
22: return τ
problem to find the largest stealthy attack impact DA∗(τ), where A
∗ is the set of critical sensors
that have such stealthy attack impact (note that this can be more than one sensor). Similarly, we
let Amin be the set of sensors that have the smallest stealthy attack impact DAmin(τ). To reduce
DA∗(τ), we assign τ
(a) for each a ∈ A∗ to a smaller threshold. Then, to keep the number of false
alarms unchanged, we increase the threshold τ (b) for each b ∈ Amin to compensate for the false
alarms added by detectors of sensors in A∗. These steps are repeated until there is no progress
in the solution. We formalize this in Algorithm 6.2, where we let FPs(τ
(s)) = E[T (s)fa (τ (s))] for
readability.
6.7 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our contributions considering a case study of a safety-critical process
control system. In particular, we study the well-known Tennessee-Eastman process control system
(TE-PCS). First, we design regression-based anomaly detectors for the critical sensors in the system
(e.g., pressure of the reactor, level of the product stripper). Then, we consider scenarios where
an adversary launches sensor attacks using the adversarial regression problem in order to drive the
system to an unsafe state. We evaluate the resilience of the system against such attacks using
baseline detectors and the proposed resilient detector.
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6.7.1 Tennessee-Eastman Process Control System
We present a brief description of the Tennessee-Eastman Process Control System (TE-PCS). TE-PCS
involves two simultaneous gas-liquid exothermic reactions for producing two liquid products [37].
The process has five major units: reactor, condenser, vapor-liquid separator, recycle compressor,
and product stripper. The chemical process consists of an irreversible reaction which occurs in the
vapour phase inside the reactor. Two non-condensible reactants A and C react in the presence of
an inert B to form a non-volatile liquid product D. The feed stream 1 contains A, C, and trace of
B; feed stream 2 is pure A; stream 3 is the purge containing vapours of A, B, and C; and stream 4
is the exit for liquid product D.
Safety Constraints and Control Objectives There are 6 safety constraints that must not be
violated (e.g, safety limits for the pressure and temperature of reactor). These safety constraints
correspond to 5 critical sensors: pressure, level, and temperature of the reactor, level of the product
stripper, and level of the separator. Further, there are several control objectives that should be
satisfied, e.g., maintaining process variables at desired values and keeping system state within safe
operating conditions. The monitoring and control objectives are obtained using 41 measurement
outputs and 12 manipulated variables.
Simulation of Sensor Attacks We use the revised Simulink model of TE-PCS [13]. We consider
the implementation of the decentralized control law as proposed by [116]. To launch sensor attacks
against TE-PCS, we update the Simulink model to obtain an information flow similar to Figure 6.2.
That is, the adversary receives all the sensor measurements and control inputs, solves the adversarial
regression problem, and then adds the error vector to the actual measurements.
Figure 6.5 shows how a sensor attack may drive the system to an unsafe state. In this scenario,
the pressure of the reactor exceeds 3000 kPa which is beyond the safety limit and can result in
reactor explosion.
6.7.2 Regression-Based Anomaly Detector
Collection of Normal Data To protect the system against sensor attacks, we build a detector
for each critical sensor (i.e., D = Sc). To train predictors for the machine learning regression-based
detectors, we need data that correctly represent system behavior in different operation modes. To
do so, we run simulations that model the system operation for 72 hours. We collect the sensor
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Figure 6.5: Pressure of the reactor when a sensor attack starts at k = 0.5. After 2 hours the pressure
reaches an unsafe state.
measurements (i.e., xmeas) and control inputs (i.e., xmv). Each simulation consists of 7200 timesteps
and thus, for each simulation scenario, we record 7200×53 datapoints. To make sure that the dataset
represents different modes of operation, we repeat the same steps for different initial state values.
We consider a total of 20 different initial state values which gives us 20×7200×53 ≈ 7.5 million
datapoints. Three of the control inputs are always constant and so effectively we only store 50
values at each timestep.
Linear Regression-Based Detector
Using our collected data, we train linear regression models for the critical sensors. We use the
current value of the remaining 36 non-critical sensors as well as the 9 non-constant control inputs
as features of the model. Figure 6.6 shows the performance of the linear regression predictor on
training and test data. Note that since the data is sequential, the train and test data cannot be
randomly sampled and instead, we divide the data in two blocks. Also, to be able to compare the
performance of predictors trained for different variables, we compute the MSE for normalized values
instead of the actual values.
For the temperature variable, we using a ridge (l2 regularized) linear regression model with λ =
1500 selected using cross-validation. With this model we obtain MSEtrain = 0.70 and MSEtest =
0.75.
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Figure 6.6: MSE of Linear Regression, Neural Network, and Ensemble Model (computed with
normalized data).
Table 6.2: MSE of Test Data (Original Scale)
PR LR TR LP LS
LR-MSE 9.05 0.26 0.00 1.53 7.17
NN-MSE 6.28 0.25 0.00 1.41 5.90
EN-MSE 5.74 0.26 0.00 1.33 5.81
Neural Network-Based Detector
Next, we train the neural network regression models for the critical sensors. Unlike linear regression
models, neural networks require a few parameters that need to be selected (e.g., network architec-
ture, activation function, optimization algorithm, regularization technique). We considered neural
networks with 2 to 4 hidden layers and 10 to 20 neurons in each layer. All the neuron in the hidden
layers use tanh activation functions. We also experimented with ReLU activation functions but tanh
performs better. We trained the networks in Tensorflow for 5000 epochs using Adam optimizer with
β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, and  = 10
−8, and a learning rate of 0.01. Figure 6.6 shows the MSE for the
training and test sets, which outperforms the scores of the linear regression model. Figure 6.6 shows
the result for the ensemble model as well.
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6.7.3 Adversarial Regression
We solve the adversarial regression problem considering linear regression-, neural network-, and
the ensemble-based detectors. Figure 6.7a shows the maximum and mean of the solution of the
adversarial regression problem as a function of the attacker’s budget for the pressure of the reactor.
As expected, a powerful attacker that has a higher budget is able to carry out larger stealthy
perturbations. Further, Figure 6.7b shows the solution of the adversarial regression for each critical
sensor considering different detectors. In the y-axis, the distance parameter is the deviation that is
needed in order to reach an unsafe state. Based on our results, level of the separator seems to be the
most critical parameter. As it can be seen, the temperature of the reactor is the least critical sensor
while the level of the stripper is the most critical. Also, Algorithm 6.1 efficiently computed worst-case
attacks, which depending on the selected hyper-parameters, took between 20-100 iterations.
Surprisingly, neural network models tend to be more vulnerable than linear regression. Further,
ensembles of linear and neural network regression do not significantly reduce this vulnerability either.
The only interesting exception is the product stripper sensor, which is indeed substantially more
vulnerable to attacks.
6.7.4 Resilient Detector
We use the resilient detector algorithm to find threshold values that reduce the stealthy attack
impact as defined in Section 6.6. We do this in the context of linear regression. Let T ∗ = 1 hour,
be the desired value for the expected time between false alarms for all detectors. As the baseline,
for each detector s ∈ D, we set threshold values τs = FP−1s (T ∗ · |D|). This way, each detector is
expected to generate 5 alarms per day as shown in Figure 6.8b.
Then, we use Algorithm 6.2 to change thresholds in order to improve resilience. At first iteration,
stripper level is the most critical sensor, and reactor temperature is the least critical sensor, therefore,
the algorithm decreases the threshold corresponding to the stripper level, and increases the threshold
for the other detectors in order to maintain the same false alarm performance. These steps are
repeated until the algorithm converges to a local optimum (which in our implementation took about
20 iterations). As shown in Figure 6.8, the worst-case stealthy attack impact (i.e., stripper level)
is reduced compared to the baseline. This is obtained by increasing the stealthy attack impact for
sensors that were less critical. Also, note that this improvement in resilience is attained with zero
cost (i.e., no increase in false alarms).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.7: (a) Adversarial regression for the pressure of the reactor considering different budgets.
Surprisingly, linear regression outperforms neural networks. In the figure, δmax is the maximum
error that can be added to the measurements of a critical sensor at a timestep. (b) Criticality
analysis of the five safety-critical sensors. Criticality is defined as the maximum of δmax during a
time interval over distance, where distance is the difference between operating point and safety limit
for a critical sensor.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.8: Resilient Detector compared to Baseline. (a) Impact of Attack. (b) Number of False
Positives (per day).
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the adversarial regression problem in CPS. We considered a scenario
where the CPS is monitored by machine learning regression-based anomaly detectors. As our threat
model, we considered an omniscient adversary that is capable of perturbing the values of a subset of
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sensors. The adversary’s objective is to lead the system to an unsafe state (e.g., raising the pressure
of a reactor in a process control system beyond its safety limit) without being detected. We solved
the adversarial regression problem considering linear regression and neural network. Surprisingly,
we discovered that the neural network model is more vulnerable than the linear regression model.
Then, we presented a resilient detector that mitigates the impact of stealthy attacks through resilient
configuration of detection thresholds. We numerically evaluated the adversarial regression problem,
and demonstrated the effectiveness of the resilient detector using a case study of a process control
system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
The vulnerability of CPS to anomalies has resulted in many research topics in the design, evaluation,
and implementation of resilient anomaly detection methods in CPS. The goal of this thesis was to
address the various challenges facing the problem of resilient detection in CPS to ensure successful
and survivable operation. Throughout the thesis, we observed how incorporating knowledge of the
physical system in the design of anomaly detectors can lead to improved resilience. Most of our
analysis was performed considering powerful attackers as this can provide an upper bound on the
worst performance of the anomaly detection tools. Our results were supported using theoretical
results as well as practical implementations. In particular, we validated our approaches considering
real-world CPS such as water distribution systems, intelligent transportation systems, and process
control systems. We hope that our results aid the theoreticians as well as the practitioners in the
design and implementation of Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems.
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